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ABSTRACT 
Differential Market Reaction to 
Selected Accounting Changes 
September 1981 
Dennis F. Murray, B.S., M.S., S.U.N.Y. at Albany 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Pieter T. Elgers 
A number of previous studies have indicated that not 
all accounting principle changes convey the same 
information signal to financial statement users. 
Financial statement users may perceive different 
implications for various types of accounting principle 
changes. Accounting Principle Board Opinion No. 20, 
however, essentially requires uniform accounting and 
disclosures for all changes in accounting principle. If 
financial statement users do perceive different 
implications for various types of accounting principle 
changes, it can reasonably be argued that the accounting 
for all types of changes in accounting principles should 
not be the same. It may better serve the needs of 
financial statement users if the information that is most 
relevant for each type of change is disclosed. 
This study develops a typology of accounting 
principle changes. The typology consists of a dichotomy 
v 
based on whether or not the change possesses economic 
consequences. A change can have economic consequences for 
four reasons: 1) the change itself has a direct economic 
impact on the firm, 2) the change has an indirect economic 
impact on the firm via its effect on managerial behavior, 
3) the change is associated with events having an economic 
impact and 4) the change, independent of the above three 
considerations, provides financial statement users with a 
new view of economic reality. It is further suggested 
that since financial statement users are concerned about 
economic decisions, only changes possessing economic 
consequences will be relevant to them (i.e., have 
information content). Since information content is often 
used as a rationale to justify costly accounting 
disclosures, an assessment of the information content of 
various accounting principle changes should be of interest 
to accounting policy makers. 
The information content of three accounting principle 
changes was examined in this study: changes to LIFO, 
changes in response to SFAS No. 13 and changes to the 
flow-through method of accounting for the investment tax 
credit. The latter two changes were treated as a 
composite since neither was thought, on an a priori basis, 
to possess economic consequences. 
vi 
Information content was operationalized by examining 
the stock market reaction associated with the accounting 
principle changes. A matched-pair control group was used. 
This study also employed a multivariate approach in 
assessing market reactions. The dependent variables 
examined were risk adjusted rates of return, changes in 
systematic risk and abnormal trading volume activity. 
Statistical significance was assessed using Hotelling’s 
T2 . 
The results of the study indicated that there was an 
adverse market reaction to the LIFO changes in terms of 
risk adjusted rates of return. This finding runs counter 
to the conventional wisdom which posits that the market 
would react positively to a LIFO change because of the 
associated improvement in cash flows generated by reduced 
tax payments. Subsequent analyses indicated that the LIFO 
changes examined in this study acted as signals regarding 
increased inventory costs that could not be passed along 
to consumers. There was no discernable market reaction to 
the other changes examined. 
LIFO changes were found to posses information content 
and therefore to be worthy of disclosure. Changes induced 
by SFAS No. 13 and changes to the flow-through method 
v 11 
were found not to have information content. The rationale 
used to justify disclosures relating to these changes must 
rest on grounds other than information content. A small 
sample size for the latter two changes and the possibly 
time specific nature of the LIFO results are two primary 
limitations of this study. 
v i i i 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
It is well recognized that a major objective of 
financial accounting is to provide decision relevant 
information to the users of financial statements. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), for example, 
has taken the position that "Financial reporting should 
provide information that is useful to present and 
potential investors and creditors and other users in 
making rational investment, credit and similar decisions” 
(1978, paragraph 3^)• One area where financial accounting 
and reporting is well articulated relates to changes in 
accounting principles. Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes, details the 
accounting and disclosure requirements for changes in 
accounting principles. Broadly stated, the objective of 
this study is to assess the information content of 
selected accounting principle changes and their related 
disclosures. 
More specifically, this paper investigates the 
information content of joint signals related to changes in 
accounting principles. Several recent studies have 
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indicated that the market does not react uniformly to the 
same accounting event. Rather, the market reacts 
differentially with respect to similar events, where the 
differential reaction is a function of other related 
events or variables. Harrison (1977) found different 
stock return activity associated with discretionary vs. 
nondiscretionary accounting changes that increased net 
income. Abdel-khalik and McKeown (1978a) found a 
significant interaction between a firm’s decision to 
switch to the Last-in, First-out (LIFO) inventory method 
and the sign of the forecasted change in net income. 
These studies can be viewed as part of a larger and 
growing body of research examining the joint information 
effect of accounting items and other variables (see e.g., 
Patell (1976) and Griffin (1976)). 
The 
accounting 
financial 
perceive 
accounting 
however , 
disclosure 
financial 
implicatio 
changes, 
studies cited above 
changes convey the 
statement users. Fina 
different implication 
principle changes, 
essentially requires 
for all changes in ac 
statement users 
ns for various types 
it can reasonably be 
indicate that not 
same information signal 
ncial statement users 
s for various types 
APB Opinion No. 
uniform accounting 
counting principles, 
do perceive differ 
of accounting princi 
argued that the account 
all 
to 
may 
of 
20, 
and 
If 
ent 
pie 
ing 
3 
for all types of changes in accounting principles should 
not be the same. It may better serve the needs of 
financial statement users if the information that is most 
relevant for each type of change is disclosed. 
For example., due to current tax regulations, switches 
to LIFO are usually associated with an improved cash flow 
generated by reduced tax payments. The improvement in 
cash flow is a major result associated with the LIFO 
change. It may be desirable for the tax savings 
associated with a LIFO switch to be disclosed. Other 
changes in accounting principles are not necessarily 
associated with a tax savings but may reflect other 
changes in the economic situation of the firm. A change 
in depreciation method may reflect a change in 
management’s perception of the pattern of expiration of 
fixed assets* services. For this type of change, it may 
be beneficial to disclose the impact of the change on 
depreciation expense. Still other accounting changes may 
be associated with no alteration in the economic situation 
of the firm. 
To reiterate, if different types of accounting 
principle changes provide dissimilar information signals, 
there is no compelling rationale to require uniform 
accounting and disclosure across all types of changes in 
accounting principles. A more useful approach would be to 
tailor the accounting for each type of change so that the 
information most relevant for a certain type of change is 
provided. This study is an attempt to assess whether 
financial statement users do perceive different changes in 
accounting principles as emitting different information 
signals. In particular, this study examines whether 
certain accounting principle changes possess information 
content and whether others do not. Operationally, this is 
accomplished by examining the stock market reaction to 
various types of changes in accounting principles. This 
is a first step toward the delineation of specific 
disclosure requirements for different types of accounting 
principle changes. The identification of the nature and 
extent of these disclosure requirements is not the topic 
of this study. 
The finding that certain groups of changes have 
information content and other groups do not has importance 
for the formulation of accounting policies. The process 
by which accounting data are accumulated and communicated 
to financial statement users is a costly one. The 
monetary costs involved include salaries, computer usage 
and auditing fees among others. Costs of a different 
nature are also borne by financial statement users. They 
must process and analyze the data that appears in 
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financial statements; these costs will increase as the 
amount of data that is provided expands. One rationale 
that is often invoked to justify costly accounting 
disclosures is that of information content. Accounting 
disclosures are said to be warranted if they provide 
information that is useful to financial statement users in 
making economic decisions. If it can be shown that 
certain accounting changes do not possess information 
content, justification for disclosures relating to these 
changes must rest on other grounds. If this support does 
not exist, the FASB should consider the elimination of 
disclosure requirements for those changes lacking 
information content. 
On the other hand, disclosure of changes that do have 
information content can be justified on the grounds that 
they convey decision relevant information. Furthermore, 
if the information content is related to economic 
consequences, the FASB should consider tailoring the 
disclosure requirements for different types of changes so 
that the information most relevant with respect to each 
change is disclosed. It should be noted that the FASB has 
recently expressed interest in the economic consequences 
of mandated changes in accounting principles (see Zeff 
(1978)) and presumably is also concerned about the 
economic consequences of discretionary changes in 
6 
accounting principles. 
Typology of Accounting Principle Changes 
A necessary element of this study is the 
identification of a useful classification scheme or 
typology of accounting principle changes. The scheme 
should be useful in the sense that it possesses the 
potential for generating accounting policy 
recommendations. That is, the scheme should be structured 
so that an a priori argument can be advanced regarding 1) 
which changes might be relevant to financial statement 
users and 2) what the appropriate disclosures might be for 
the various categories of the scheme. 
Harrison (1977) investigated joint information 
signals related to accounting changes by developing a 
typology based upon the discretionary/nondiscretionary 
dichotomy and the sign of the effect of the change on net 
income. It will be argued in Chapter II that Harrison’s 
classification scheme has certain shortcomings. It does 
not, for example, provide any compelling rationale as to 
why a differential reaction would be expected and 
therefore holds little promise in the way of 
recommendations for accounting policy. 
An improved scheme based upon whether the change 
7 
possesses economic implications for the firm is presented 
in Chapter III. Certain types of changes have an economic 
impact on the firm or are associated with events having an 
economic impact, whereas other changes, often labeled as 
"bookkeeping" or "cosmetic", do not. This study will test 
the hypothesis that financial statement users will not 
react in a uniform manner to these two broad groups of 
changes in accounting principles. It is expected that 
financial statement users will percieve those changes that 
have direct or indirect economic implications for the firm 
as having information content and that they will perceive 
those changes that do not have economic implications for 
the firm as not having information content. 
Three specific accounting principle changes have been 
selected for study. Changes to LIFO have been selected as 
being representative of a change having economic 
implications. Changes to the flow-through method of 
accounting for the investment tax credit (ITC) and changes 
induced by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) No. 13, Accounting for Leases, have been selected 
as being representative of changes that do not have direct 
economic implications. The typology of accounting 
principle changes used here and the rationale for 
selecting the three changes mentioned above are discussed 
more fully in Chapter III. 
8 
Methodological Improvements Over Past Studies 
A number of previous studies have examined the stock 
market reaction to changes in accounting principles. Only 
a limited amount of confidence can, however, be placed in 
these studies due to certain weaknesses in their research 
designs. There are two major problems. One relates to 
the selection of a control group and the other concerns 
the absence of statistical tests. Generally, the control 
groups used in prior studies were selected randomly from 
those firms that did not make any accounting change. The 
possibility then arises that the dependent variable is 
influenced by confounding variables. This can occur 
because firms cannot be randomly assigned to the change 
and nonchange groups; they have pre-selected themselves 
into these groups and this pre-selection may be correlated 
with events or variables other than the act of changing 
accounting principles. Any difference between the two 
groups on the dependent variable may potentially be 
attributed to factors other than the one of interest 
(i.e., the accounting change) [1]. 
The approach taken in this study to deal with the 
confounding variable problem was to choose control groups 
on the basis of a careful matching. The matching process, 
the variables used in this process and the reasons for 
selecting these variables are described in Chapter IV. 
9 
The other problem of the research designs of past 
studies is that no formal statistical comparisons were 
made between the experimental and the control groups [2]. 
Usually cumulative average residuals (CARs) were plotted 
and visually compared. This study utilizes Hotelling's T c 
which is the multivariate analog of the univariate t test 
to assess differences between the change and nonchange 
groups. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter II surveys the major empirical studies on 
accounting changes. This review is done in a critical 
manner so as to help provide the motivation for the 
current study. Only those accounting change studies that 
have a bearing on this research project are included in 
the literature review. 
Chapter III presents the typology of accounting 
principle changes that is used in the study. The typology 
is described in detail and the reasoning for the selection 
of the three changes examined in this study is discussed. 
The hypotheses tested in this study are also presented. 
Chapter IV describes the methodology employed in this 
study. The hypotheses generated in Chapter III are 
operationalized by explicitly defining all variables and 
10 
describing the statistical tests used. The matching 
process used in the generation of the control groups is 
described as well. 
Chapter V contains the results of the analyses. The 
sample of change and nonchange firms are identified along 
with the results of the matching process. The results of 
the tests of the research hypotheses are also presented. 
Chapter VI includes conclusions reached based upon 
the results described in Chapter V, limitations of the 
study and suggestions for future research. 
11 
Footnotes 
1. This issue is discussed in detail in Foster 
( 1980) . 
2. Harrison (1977), Abdel-khalik and Mckeown (1978a) 
and Brown (1980) are prominent exceptions. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A number of past research efforts have empirically 
investigated the stock market reaction to accounting 
changes. However, only those having direct implications 
for the research conducted here are reviewed. Studies 
treating accounting changes as a composite and studies 
dealing with accounting principle changes other than 
changes to LIFO, changes in the accounting for the 
investment tax credit and changes in response to SFAS No. 
13 will not be discussed. 
LIFO Studies 
Ball (1972) examined 71 changes to the LIFO inventory 
method that occured from 19^7 to I960 [1]. He found that 
on average, in the year prior to the change, firms that 
switched to LIFO earned a risk adjusted rate of return of 
7%, An inference that can be drawn from this result is 
that the market perceived there to be tax advantages 
associated with LIFO and used this information in 
establishing the securities’ equilibrium prices. In other 
words, the market perceived the change to have information 
content. 
12 
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Sunder (1973) studied both changes to LIFO and 
changes to the First-in, First-out (FIFO) inventory 
method. With respect to the LIFO group, he found results 
similar to Ball’s. Sunder accumulated residuals for the 
fiscal year in which the change was implemented. On 
average, the LIFO group experienced a 5% risk adjusted 
return and the FIFO group earned a .8% risk adjusted 
return. Again the inference could be drawn that the 
market used the information regarding the perceived tax 
advantages associated with LIFO in establishing 
equilibrium prices of the firms’ securities. Sunder 
(1975) re-examined his sample using techniques to adjust 
for a possible change in the firms’ systematic risk. 
Substantially the same results were found. 
Both the Ball (1972) and Sunder (1973; 1975) studies 
suffer from several methodological flaws. Ball does not 
use an explicit control group. Implicitly, he is using 
the entire market as a control by employing as his 
dependent variable risk adjusted rates of return. This 
does not, however, control for a host of variables that 
could account for the departure of the residuals from 
zero. Industry factors are an example. In fact, Sunder 
(1973) provides some evidence on this point. His sample 
contained a disproportionately large number of steel 
firms. While the risk adjusted return of the entire LIFO 
14 
group for the year of the change was 556, the risk adjusted 
return for the steel firms that switched to LIFO was 1856 
for the same period. It therefore seems quite plausible 
that the industry composition of a sample may have a 
marked impact on the results and accordingly this variable 
should be explicitly controlled for. 
A recent study by Brown (1980) suggests that yet 
another confounding variable may have had an impact on 
both Ball’s and Sunder’s results. Brown randomly selected 
a group of firms that changed to LIFO and a group of firms 
that did not. Table 1 summarizes the earnings history of 
these two groups. Since 73 out of 86 of the change 
companies switched to LIFO in 1974, the results of that 
year are of the most interest. It can be seen that in 
every year the average earnings per share (EPS) of the 
change companies exceeds that of the nonchange companies. 
Moreover, in 1973 and 1974 the differences are 
statistically significant at the .05 and .001 level, 
respectively. It is also interesting . to examine the 
increases in EPS from year to year. In all years, the 
change group experienced a greater increase in EPS (in 
both absolute and percentage terms) than did the nonchange 
group. 
The implication of the above for the interpretation 
15 
of the Ball and Sunder studies is as follows. LIFO 
generally results in tax savings and this is usually 
considered to be the primary motivator for management to 
switch to LIFO. As income prospects improve, the tax 
savings associated with LIFO increase and the motivation 
to switch to LIFO accordingly increases [2]. It would not 
be surprising to find that firms that have switched to 
LIFO have also recently experienced a favorable growth in 
earnings. This is exactly what Brown has found. His two 
groups differ not only with respect to the LIFO switch, 
but with respect to EPS and changes in EPS. Furthermore, 
there is theoretical support for the contention that 
earnings are associated with the value of the firm (e.g., 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) and Hamada (1972)), and ample 
empirical evidence on the association of stock price 
changes with unanticipated changes in earnings (e.g., Ball 
and Brown (1968) and Beaver et al. (1979)). Ball’s and 
Sunder’s results can now be reinterpreted. The positive 
risk adjusted rates of return they found to be associated 
with LIFO changes may well not have been solely a reaction 
by the market to the switch to LIFO, but may also have 
reflected a reaction to another variable that 
distinguished the two groups: favorable unanticipated 
earnings changes. 
The final study to be reviewed regarding LIFO changes 
16 
was conducted by Abdel-khalik and McKeown (1978a). They 
used analysis of variance to examine the CARs of 107 firms 
that switched to LIFO and a matched control group [3]. By 
using a factorial design, they also assessed the impact of 
the sign of the forecasted change in earnings on the CARs. 
A significant interaction was found between the decision 
to switch to LIFO and the sign of the forecasted earnings 
change. Firms that switched to LIFO and that had a 
forecasted increase in earnings had substantially larger 
CARs than did any other group. This implies that the 
market is selective in its interpretation of accounting 
information. A firm that experiences an earnings increase 
will, ceteris paribus, benefit more from the tax 
advantages of a LIFO switch than a firm that experiences 
an earnings decrease [4], The results of this study 
indicate that the market used information about the 
forecasted increase in earnings along with the LIFO switch 
in establishing equilibrium prices. After isolation of 
the interaction, the main effects were not significant. 
ITC Studies 
Another group of studies has examined changes from the 
deferral to the flow-through method of accounting for the 
ITC. Kaplan and Roll (1972) were the first to examine the 
market impact of this type of change. Their sample 
consisted of 275 firms that changed to the flow-through 
17 
method of accounting for the ITC and 57 firms that 
maintained the use of the deferral method. Weekly 
measures of risk adjusted returns were calculated for the 
30 weeks before and after the date of the change (i.e., 
the earnings announcement date) . It was found that the 
change group experienced consistently positive risk 
adjusted rates of return during the 10 weeks surrounding 
the earnings announcement. In the ensuing weeks, however, 
these gains to stockholders were virtually eliminated. 
This finding is consistent with an efficient capital 
market (in the semi-strong sense) and an information 
market characterized by an imperfection. With the 
preliminary earnings figure inflated by the accounting 
change (which may then be unknown to capital market 
participants) , investors responded by bidding up a 
security’s price. When the accounting change subsequently 
became known to.the market with the publication of the 
annual report, the security price correspondingly 
declined. 
The control group experienced a 9% risk adjusted 
return over the 60 week test period. Kaplan and Roll 
speculate that managers of the control group firms did not 
switch methods of accounting for the ITC because they 
anticipated reporting subtantial earnings increases in any 
event. The possibility certainly exists that the abnormal 
18 
CARs of the control group are, in part, caused by improved 
earnings. 
Cassidy (1976) provides some evidence as to why the 
CARs of Kaplan and Roll's experimental and control groups 
differ. He studied approximately the same sample of firms 
as did Kaplan and Roll. He found that during the five 
years prior to the change, firms that switched methods 
experienced negative risk adjusted rates of return and 
that nonchange firms earned positive risk adjusted returns 
over the same period. This indicates that the difference 
in the CARs between the change and nonchange groups found 
by Kaplan and Roll may have been caused by a confounding 
variable: favorable business activity reflected by 
abnormal wealth increases to shareholders. 
There is one problem common to both the Kaplan and 
Roll study and the Cassidy study. Both conducted binomial 
tests on the change and nonchange groups separately. The 
characteristic of concern was the proportion of positive 
(or negative) residuals. A significant test statistic is 
taken to be an indication of a market reaction to the 
change. However, it is important to note that the test 
period was centered on the date of the earnings 
announcement. It may be then, that a significant binomial 
test should be interpreted as a reaction by the market to 
an unanticipated earnings change. As with the 
studies, the confounding variable of differ 
unanticipated earnings changes may, in part, explain 
empirical results. 
SFAS No. 13 Studies 
Martin et al. ( 1979) examined the risk adjusted 
of return of 17 firms that engaged in a substantial 
of leasing. The period of time over which the res 
were examined included 36 months both before and aft 
announcement month. However, focusing only on the 
starting five months before the announcement dat 
ending five months after the announcement date 
average risk adjusted rate of return amount 
approximately -5/6. At face value, this would 
indication of an adverse market reaction to c 
brought about by SFAS No. 13* However, only 1 
statistical tests were undertaken and no control gro 
employed. These flaws in the research design reduc 
confidence that can be placed in this study. 
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Only one other study has empirically examined the 
market reaction to accounting principle changes motivated 
by SFAS No. 13. Finnerty et al. (1980) investigated 
whether firms that engaged in substantial leasing were 
characterized by a change in systematic risk. They 
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employed a control group matched on industry as well as a 
randomly selected control group. They found no change in 
systematic risk for the change group or either of the 
control groups. 
In summary, many of the past studies dealing with 
LIFO changes, changes in the accounting for the ITC and 
changes in response to SFAS No. 13 have been flawed by 
problems in their research designs. In ex post research, 
experimental units self-select themselves into the 
experimental and control groups. This self-selection may 
be on the basis of variables other that the one of 
interest. It may be these other variables to which any 
difference between groups on the dependent variable should 
be attributed. Limited evidence, cited above, is 
available which indicates that confounding variables were 
present in previous studies. It is essential that future 
studies take steps to ensure that these confounding 
variables do not differentially influence the dependent 
variables across groups. 
Harrison»s Study 
The final study to be reviewed, Harrison (1977), has 
many similarities to the research which is proposed here. 
He argues that not all accounting changes provide the 
market with the same information signal. Discretionary 
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accounting principle changes provide information regarding 
a new income construct and also imply something regarding 
managements’ motivation for undertaking the change. 
Nondiscretionary accounting principle changes provide 
signals primarily regarding the new income construct since 
management is not voluntarily undertaking the change. 
Furthermore, the sign of the effect of the change on net 
income is thought to interact with the act of making a 
change. A discretionary accounting change that increases 
(decreases) net income may imply that management is 
anticipating unfavorable (favorable) business prospects in 
the future. On the other hand, nondiscretionary 
accounting principle changes that increase (decrease) net 
income may reflect managements’ past conservative 
(liberal) bias in reporting net income. 
Harrison (1977) examined 280 accounting changes and 
classified them into four categories based upon the 
discretionary/nondiscretionary characteristic and the sign 
of the impact of the change on net income. Four 
matched-pair control groups, one for each type of change, 
were selected. Matching was done on 1) industry, 2) 
systematic risk and 3) fiscal year end. For each type of 
change, total returns on iso-beta portfolios of the change 
and nonchange groups were compared. The returns were 
accumulated over a thirteen month period centered on the 
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second month following the fiscal year end. The average 
return to firms making discretionary accounting changes 
that increased net income were significantly below that of 
their control group, while the average return to firms 
making nondiscretionary accounting changes that increased 
net income were significantly greater than the returns of 
their control group. 
While the results indicate that the market uses the 
discretionary/nondiscretionary characteristic of the 
change, it is difficult to speculate as to why. The 
evidence indicated that the market penalizes firms making 
discretionary changes that increase net income. 
Presumably this is related to managements’ motivation. 
However, as Harrison points out, ’’the list of potential 
sources of motivation is almost endless” (1977, p.85). 
Therefore, although this study indicates that the market 
does not perceive all accounting changes uniformly, it 
does little to answer the question of why. Moreover, the 
results as well as Harrison's a priori reasoning do not 
provide a firm basis for the generation of specific 
testable hypotheses. For example, Harrison hypothesizes 
that firms making a nondiscretionary accounting change 
that increases net income will experience differentially 
greater returns than a control group because the change is 
evidence of managements' former conservative bias in 
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stating net income. However the efficient market 
hypothesis would indicate that in past years investors 
would be aware of this bias and estimate any adjustment to 
net income that they feel is appropriate. It is only 
corrections to this adjusted figure, not corrections to 
the previously reported income construct, that will cause 
an investor reaction. Therefore, the sign of the 
difference between the new and old income constructs 
should not be the basis of an hypothesis regarding 
investor reaction; the hypothesis should be based on the 
sign of the diffenence between the new income construct 
and the old construct as adjusted by the market. 
The next chapter describes a 
based upon the economic impact 
permit one to speculate on the 
accounting change. 
classification scheme 
of a change that does 
market impact of an 
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Footnotes 
1. Ball actually examined 267 changes of many types 
and his primary analysis is on the entire group. 
However, he also disaggregated his sample based 
upon the type of the change and reported those 
results. 
2. All other things being equal, firms with 
increasing earnings may potentially benefit from 
a LIFO switch more than other firms. Implicit in 
this proposition is the assumption that as 
earnings increase, inventory holding gains also 
increase. 
3. Matching was based upon industry and systematic 
risk. 
4. See footnote 2. 
CHAPTER III 
TYPOLOGY OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE CHANGES 
The hypothesis that various changes in accounting 
principles emit different information signals to the 
market is a reasonable one. However, prior to the 
undertaking of an empirical investigation or the making of 
an accounting policy recommendation, it is essential that 
a framework be developed that provides a useful 
perspective of changes in accounting principles. The 
framework or typology should fulfill two functions: 
1. it should serve as the basis to group various 
changes in accounting principles based on the 
correspondence between the characteristics of the 
change and the categories of the typology, and 
2. the categories of the typology should provide 
guidance in the formulation of specific 
disclosure and accounting requirements 
In addition to Harrison’s (1977) scheme, which was 
reviewed in the previous chapter, several other typologies 
of accounting changes have been suggested in the 
accounting literature. They are presented below. 
Gonedes and Dopuch 
Gonedes and Dopuch (197*0 developed a typology based 
upon the effects of the change. Their typology consists 
of five categories (p. 84): 
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1. A change in the techniques used for external 
reporting (one result of a firm’s 
information-production decisions) that does not 
affect the information-production costs incurred 
by the firm or the information-production 
decisions and/or costs of agents external to the 
firm 
2. A change having the properties of 1. except that 
it does affect a firm's information-production 
costs 
3. A change having the properties of 1. except that 
it does affect the information-production 
decisions and/or costs of agents external to the 
firm 
4. A change in the techniques used for external 
reporting that is, for whatever reason, . 
associated with a change in some other aspect of 
a firm’s production-investment activities 
5. A change in the accounting techniques used for 
tax reporting 
It may well be a misnomer to label the above 
classification scheme as a typology. The ’’types" of 
accounting changes are more in the nature of 
characteristics than categories, since a given change may 
belong to more than one category. 
This typology has been appropriately critized by Park 
et al. (1980) on the grounds that it fails to distinguish 
between 1) changes that have no economic impact and do not 
provide financial statement users with a new view of 
economic reality and 2) changes that have no economic 
impact and do provide financial statement users with a new 
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view of economic reality. That is, while a change itself 
may have no impact on the economic situation of the firm, 
the accounting numbers generated by the new accounting 
procedure may provide financial statement users with a 
perspective of the firm that was previously unavailable. 
Park 
In an attempt to circumvent this shortcoming, Park et 
al. ( 1980) developed their own typology which consists of 
three levels: 
1. the ch ange has d iscern abl e economic effect 
2. there is n o disc ernabl e e conomic effect and 
possible for f inan cia 1 statement user 
transi ate betwee n the old and new princ iple 
3. there is n o disc ernabl e e conomic effect and 
not po ssible for f ina nci al statement user 
transi ate betwee n the old and new princ iple 
According to Park et al. (1980), only changes of the 
second type should be labeled as purely "cosmetic" or 
"bookkeeping". 
The above typology falls short of the mark on several 
points. The term "discer nable e conomic effect" in the 
first c ategory is rather bro ad Di ffe rent changes h ave 
unlike implic at ions for a firm and should not all be 
studied as a c ohesive gro up. The fi r st category needs to 
be mor e d et a iled with res pe ct to the types of "economic 
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effect”. 
A second criticism relates to the third category. In 
the year of a change, APB Opinion No. 20 requires the 
reporting of net income under both the old and the new 
principle. Many companies also voluntarily disclose 
additional information. For example, a company that 
changes from the straight line method of depreciation to 
the sum-of-the-years-digits method is required to report 
the effect of the change on net income. Additionally, 
many companies also report the effect of the change on 
depreciation expense (these two amounts may differ because 
of tax effects). If this is the case, then financial 
statement users can translate from one method to the other 
in the year of the change. Therefore, category three is 
not especially meaningful. 
Typology Based on Economic Consequences 
In order to eliminate 
above classification schemes, 
that can be attributed to a 
has been developed. It i 
consequences of the change 
some of the weaknesses of the 
a set of characteristics 
n accounting principle change 
s based on the economic 
and consists of two broad 
classes. The scheme is as follows: 
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1. The change has economic consequences . 
1. the chang e has a direct economic impact on 
the firm 
2. the change has an indirect economic impact on 
the firm via its effect on managerial 
behavior 
3. the change is associated with events having 
an economic impact on the firm 
4. the change provides financial statement users 
with a new view of economic reality 
independent of its economic impact 
2. The change is purely cosmetic, meaning that it 
possesses none of the above characteristics 
Categories 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. An accounting 
principle change either does or does not have economic 
consequences for the firm. The sub-categories in category 
1 are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, reflect 
characteristics which could be possessed to a greater or 
lesser degree by any change having economic consequences. 
Illustrations of the categories in the scheme may 
serve to make the distinctions between the types of 
changes more clear. Changes to LIFO would generally be 
considered to be of type 1.1 because of the cash flow 
effects arising from the tax implications of this change. 
An accounting change involving substantial bookkeeping 
costs would also be of type 1.1. 
A change induced by FASB Statement No. 8, Accounting 
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for the Transiation of Foreign Currency Transactions and 
Foreign Currency Statements, is a good illustration of 
type 1.2. While FASB Statement No. 8 merely relates to 
the accounting for transactions involving foreign 
currencies, Evans e_t al. ( 1978) have found that the 
statement has motivated many firms to alter their foreign 
exchange risk management practices. 
A change to the percentage of completion method for 
long-term construction contracts is a change of type 1.3. 
A change to this method would generally indicate that a 
firm and its auditors feel that the degree to which 
project costs can be estimated has improved and/or the 
collectability of billings to customers is more assured. 
A change in depreciation method may be of type 1.4. 
This change may provide financial statement users with 
accounting numbers (a view of reality) which were 
previously unavailable. This assumes, of course, that 
there is not a concurrent change for tax purposes nor a 
change in the pattern by which the assets’ services 
expire. 
It should be emphasized again that types 1.1 thru 1.4 
are not mutually exclusive; they are more in the nature of 
characteristics. More than one can apply to a g iven 
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change. For example, changes as soc ia 
possess c haracteristic s 1.2 and 1 .4. 
having economic consequences can 
unambiguo usly assigned to any parti 
judgement must be ex ercised in the a 
identifyi ng the most important char 
change. 
ted with FASB Mo. 8 
Accounting changes 
not, generally, be 
cular sub-category; 
ssignment process by 
acteristic of each 
A priori, it is suggested that changes of category 1 
do possess information content and that those of category 
2 do not. Implicit in much of the accounting literature 
is the presumption that an objective of financial 
statement users is to make economic or business decisions 
(see e.g., FASB (1978)). It therefore is reasonable to 
expect financial statement users to find disclosures about 
category 1 changes informative but not disclosures about 
category 2 changes. 
Hypotheses 
This study is an attempt to ascertain the positioning 
of certain accounting principle changes within the 
framework of the typology developed above. Changes to 
LIFO have been selected as being representative of 
category 1, changes that have an economic impact. LIFO 
was selected for study because the tax implications of a 
switch to LIFO have an obvious economic impact and because 
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the mid-1970's provides a rich data base of LIFO changes. 
Two accounting principle changes have been selected as 
being representative of category 2, purely cosmetic 
changes: changes in response to SFAS No. 13 and changes 
to the flow-through method of accounting for the ITC. 
Neither of these changes has a direct economic impact on 
the firm; nor is it easy to see them as being associated 
with events that do have economic significance (e.g., as 
in the way a change in depreciation method may be 
associated with a change in the pattern of the expiration 
of fixed assets* services) . They are also the only two 
recently occurring changes that are not of type 1.4. That 
is, they are the only two changes which do not provide 
financial statement users with an income construct that 
was not previously available. All disclosures mandated by 
SFAS No. 13 were previously available in 10-K reports due 
to Accounting Series Release 147. Additionally, the 
information necessary to convert from the deferral to the 
flow-through method is also available in 10-K reports (but 
the information needed to convert from the flow-through 
method to the deferral method is not publicly available). 
There is a possibility that each of these changes may 
affect managerial behavior. A change in the accounting 
for the ITC may affect the capital budget because of its 
impact on reported net income. Arnold (1975) provides 
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evidence, however, that ITC changes do not alter capital 
investment decisions. Lease capitalization in response to 
SFAS Mo. 13 will generally influence various financial 
ratios which may result in certain firms violating debt 
covenants. Management may then be motivated to modify the 
firm’s capital structure in order to avoid such violation. 
There is as yet no published evidence regarding the 
managerial impact of lease accounting changes induced by 
SFAS Mo. 13. Accordingly, in addition to treating ITC 
changes and changes in response to SFAS Mo. 13 as a 
composite, separate tests were conducted on SFAS Mo. 13 
changes only. An insufficient sample size did not permit 
separate analysis of ITC changes. 
Two null hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
: Changes to LIFO do not possess information 
0 content. 
: Changes induced by SFAS Mo. 13 and changes 
0 to the flow-through method of accounting 
for the ITC do not possess information 
content. 
p 
It is expected that H ^ will be rejected and that H will 
o 0 
not be rej ected . 
The following chapter operationalizes the above 
hypotheses and describes the methodology used in this 
s^iid y 
CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Ex perimental Groups. Two sources were employed to 
identify firms making any of the three types of accounting 
principle changes examined in this study : 1) The 
Disclosure Journal, Index of Corporate Events and 2) 
Accounting Trends and Techniques. The Disclosure Journal 
was used to identify LIFO changes and ITC changes made 
during the period 1973-1975. The use of the Pisclosure 
Journal was limited to this time period because it was not 
published before 1973 nor after 1976. All LIFO changes 
occurring after October 1975 were excluded from the sample 
since it was considered desirable to have four and 
one-half years of post-change data to estimate the market 
model parameters. Firms making changes to LIFO or to the 
flow-through method of accounting for the ITC between 1970 
and 1972 were identified by referring to Accounting Trends 
and Techniques. Firms making ITC changes during 1976-1978 
and firms making changes in response to SFAS No. 13 in 
1977 or 1978 were identified by Accounting Trends and 
Techniques. Changes in response to SFAS No. 13 and ITC 
changes occurring after January 1978 were excluded from 
the study since two and one-half years of post-change data 
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were necessary to estimate the market model paramaters. 
Two additional constraints were placed on firms 
included in the sample. First, firms making two or more 
of the three changes examined in this study were excluded 
from the analysis. Secondly, sufficient price, dividend, 
trading volume and accounting data, for purposes of this 
study, had to be available on the COMPUSTAT PDE and 
Industrial Tapes. The COMPUSTAT Tapes were the primary 
data source used. For certain companies, a small amount 
of price, dividend and volume data was collected from 
Standard and Poor’s Stock Guides. 
Control Groups, A primary objective of this study is the 
elimination of the effects of a number of potentially 
confounding variables. The approach used in achieving 
this objective was to undertake a careful matching in the 
selection of control groups. For each change firm in the 
sample, a matched-pair was selected for inclusion in a 
control group. Matching was done on five variables: 1) 
industry, 2) unanticipated earnings changes, 3) 
price-earnings (P-E) ratio, 4) leverage and 5) systematic 
risk. Below each variable is defined and a justification 
is presented for its use. The matching procedure is also 
described. 
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Industry was defined in terms of SIC codes. 
Two-digit codes were used. Because of the matching 
procedure to be employed in this study (which is described 
below), use of more than two digits would result in 
industry dominating the other matching variables. The 
reason for matching on this variable is discussed in 
Chapter II. 
The need to control for the effects of unanticipated 
earnings changes was discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
The definitional problem, however, is substantial and must 
be addressed. The primary difficulty in operationally 
defining unanticipated earnings changes is the selection 
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of an earnings expectation model to serve as a proxy for 
the market’s anticipation of what a firm’s earnings will 
be. A body of research has developed in the past decade 
which is of use here. That research has investigated the 
time series properties of accounting numbers (primarily 
earnings). Most of the earlier studies (e.g., Ball and 
Watts (1972)) found that earnings follow a random walk or 
a random walk with drift model. These studies were 
followed by another group (Watts and Leftwich (1977) and 
Albrecht et al. ( 1977)) that compared random walks and 
random walks with drift to Box-Jenkins models fitted on a 
firm by firm basis. With respect to model identification, 
neither the random walk nor the random walk with drift 
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models characterized the earnings stream of a broad base 
of the sample companies. It is important to note, 
however, that Watts and Leftwich (1977) found substantial 
evidence of model misspecification in fitting the 
Box-Jenkins models. Therefore a more appealing approach 
to comparing the two types of models is predictability 
tests. On this criteria, the Watts and Leftwich (1977) 
and Albrecht et al. (1977) studies differ. The former 
found the random walk model to compare very favorably with 
the random walk with drift model and the individually 
fitted Box-Jenkins models, while the latter study found 
that the random walk model performed substantially worse 
than the random walk with drift model and the.individually 
fitted Box-Jenkins models. 
A major problem with both of the above studies in 
that the sample sizes were small. Watts and Leftwich 
examined only 25 firms and Albrecht et al. studied 49 
firms. It is not, therefore, surprising that the results 
of these two studies differed with respect to the relative 
forecasting ability of the random walk and random walk 
with drift models. Ruland (1980) has compared the 
predictability of these two models (and four others) over 
a sample of approximately 4,000 forecasts. He concludes 
that "the simple martingale dominates the other models 
tested" (1980, p.36). Since the random walk model was 
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found to predict better than the random walk with drift 
model (and four others), it will serve as the earnings 
expectation model used in this study. 
Instead of relying on a mechanical model based upon 
past earnings to serve as the proxy for the market’s 
expectations, several other approaches could be employed. 
Published forecasts by management or security analysts 
could be used. This approach is not used because of the 
lack of empirical evidence attesting to the superiority of 
these forecasts in comparison with the random walk model. 
One other earnings expectation model that was 
considered for use in this study was recently proposed by 
Beaver et al. ( 1980). They suggest that security prices 
may contain information that is useful in generating 
earnings forecasts. This may be so for at least two 
reasons: 
aggregation of earnings into yearly figures may 
result in a loss of information and this 
information may be imbedded in security prices; 
and 
security prices may reflect events that will have 
an impact on future earnings but which have not 
had an impact on current earnings (e.g., 
discovery of oil). 
By assuming 1) that reported earnings are the result 
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of a compound process comprised of factors that do or do 
not affect security prices and 2) that the earnings 
component that does affect security prices follows a 
random walk, Beaver et al. (1980) draw a relationship 
between security price changes and earnings changes. 
Empirical evidence is provided that indicates that 
security prices do not move as they would if investors 
believed earnings followed a random walk. Additionally, a 
forecasting model based on both earnings and security 
prices was compared to a random walk with drift model. 
The former model proved to be marginally superior. 
While the idea that security prices may reflect 
events upon which the market conditions its earnings 
expectations has appeal, the forecasting model suggested 
by Eeaver £t al. ( 1980) is not suitable for use in this 
study for several reasons. Their assumption that 
"ungarbled" earnings follow a random walk is crucial to 
the derivation of their model and has not been empirically 
verified. Moreover, their forecasting results are limited 
to one time horizon and one model of comparison (random 
walk with drift). Accordingly, the random walk model was 
used here as a proxy for the market’s earnings 
expectation. Unexpected changes in earnings is defined as 
earnings available for common stockholders in the year of 
the change (after adjusting for the effects of the change) 
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less earnings available for common stockholders in the 
year prior to the change. The effect of the change on net 
income was obtained from each firm’s 10-K report. 
Matching was also based on the price-earnings <P-E) 
ratio. Basu (1978) has found that the association between 
security prices and annual income numbers is not 
independent of the P-E ratio. His results are consistent 
with the price-ratio hypothesis which claims that 
investors are unduly optimistic (pessimistic) about firms 
with high (low) P-E ratios. This optimism (pessimism) 
results generally in negative (positive) unanticipated 
changes in earnings. Therefore the market reaction to an 
earnings announcement is conditional upon the P-E ratio. 
Ball (1978), on the other hand, interpreted Basu’s results 
as an indication of a misspecification in the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. Irrespective of which interpretation 
is adopted, this variable must be controlled for in order 
to eliminate it as a potential cause of differences 
between the experimental and control groups. 
Earnings yield (the inverse of the P-E ratio) is 
defined simply as the earnings available for common 
stockholders in the year prior to the change divided by 
the market value of the common stock outstanding at the 
beginning of the year of the change [1], Negative ratios 
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were not constrained in any manner. 
Another variable that was used in the matching 
process was leverage. It has long been hypothesized that 
wealth gains (losses) will accrue to debtors (creditors) 
during periods of unanticipated inflation [2]. The 
converse is hypothesized to occur during periods of 
unanticipated deflation. Recently, Bloom et al. (1980) 
have investigated the behavior of risk adjusted rates of 
return on two portfolios during the period 1959-1975. One 
portfolio consisted of firms that were net monetary 
debtors and the other consisted of firms that were net 
monetary creditors. The symmetric pattern of the CARs of 
these two groups was quite evident. Creditors experienced 
gains (losses) when debtors experienced losses (gains). 
This is persuasive evidence that stock price activity is , 
in part, conditioned by the joint effect of unanticipated 
inflation and the firm's leverage. It is, therefore, 
important to control for this effect. 
The definition of debtor position used here is the 
debt to equity ratio where equity is defined as the market 
value of a firm's common stockholders' equity and debt is 
defined as the book value of debt [31. This particular 
measure was chosen due to its wide usage and general 
acceptance as a measure of net debtor position. 
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Matching was also undertaken on a variable that is 
closely related to leverage, systematic risk (beta 
coefficient). This variable was selected for two reasons. 
One reason is because of its close relationship to 
leverage which is well documented (see e.g., Bowman 
(1979)). Additionally, Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) 
have shown that firms characterized by different market 
risk levels do not exhibit the same magnitude of risk 
adjusted rates of return. Firms of higher risk experience 
lower levels of risk adjusted rates of return than firms 
of lower risk. By matching on beta, this potential cause 
of differences between the control and experimental groups 
with respect to CARs will be eliminated. 
A number of decisions had to be made regarding the 
estimation of systematic risk. For reasons cited in the 
next section, the familiar market model was used to 
generate beta estimates. A time period and estimation 
interval also had to be selected. Recent evidence by 
Alexander and Chervany (1980) indicates that an estimation 
interval of four to six years is optimal when using 
monthly observations (as are used here). Accordingly, for 
matching purposes, systematic risk was estimated based 
upon the 48 monthly observations preceeding the test 
period [4], A time period prior to the change was 
selected since 1) it is possible for the change to affect 
systemtic risk and 2) the objective of the matching 
process is to make the matched-pairs as similar as 
possible prior to the change. 
The changes examined in this study took place in 26 
different chronological months. Since systematic risk is 
not always stable over time, it was desirable to match an 
experimental group member’s beta estimate with the beta 
estimates of the potential members of the control group 
that were generated over the same time period . 
Accordingly, 26 beta estimates (assuming d ata 
availability) for each potential member of the control 
groups were generated. A firm was considered to be a 
candidate for inclusion in a control group if it 1) did 
not make any of the three accounting principle changes 
examined here during the time period covered by this study 
and 2) appeared on the COMPUSTAT Tapes. 
It is well documented that estimates of systematic 
risk obtained from OLS regressions are considerably biased 
(see e.g., Blume (1971; 1975)). A common procedure used 
to adjust OLS betas is Vasicek’s (1973) bayesian 
adjustment. Recent evidence by Eubank and Zumwalt (1979) 
indicates that this adjustment technique performs as well 
as other techniques for the estimation periods used in 
this study. Accordingly, all OLS betas were adjusted 
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using Vasicek's procedure. The adjustment is: 
b 
v 
b/Var(b) 
1/Var(b) 
+ b /Var(b ) 
i i 
+ 1/Var(b 
i 
) 
where b = the Vasicek adjusted beta 
v 
b = the cross-sectional mean of the 
OLS betas 
Var(b) = the variance of the cross-sectional 
distribution of OLS betas 
b 
i 
Var(b ) 
i 
the specific firm’s OLS beta 
the specific firm’s squared 
standard error of the OLS beta 
Since betas were estimated for 26 different time periods, 
each OLS beta was adjusted using the appropriate 
chronological cross-sectional distribution. 
A final decision relates to the selection of an index 
to serve as a proxy for the market portfolio. As 
mentioned in the next section, all tests of hypotheses 
have been carried out using beta estimates based upon both 
the CRSP Value Weighted Index and the CRSP Equal Weighted 
Index. Both indexes could not, of course, have been used 
in the matching process. There is, however, limited 
empirical evidence that beta estimates generated from the 
CRSP Equal Weighted Index are more consistent with certain 
properties implied by the CAPM than are betas generated 
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from the CRSP Value Weighted Index (see Elgers and Murray 
(1981b)). For this reason, the CRSP Equal Weighted Index 
was used in the matching process. 
An attempt was made to match on one additional 
variable, fiscal year end. A number of news items 
regarding a firm are disclosed around its fiscal year end. 
Since the test period for both a change firm and its 
matched-pair is centered on the former’s fiscal year end, 
it was thought important to match on this variable. 
Matching on this variable, however, would have resulted in 
a drastic reduction in the number of potential candidates 
for matching with each member of the change groups. This 
coupled with the use of a 10 month test period (nearly a 
year) prompted the dropping of fiscal year end as a 
matching variable. 
The matching process was conducted as follows. For 
each change firm, all potential candidates for matching 
that were in the same industry were identified. For each 
of the firms so identified, a Mahalanobis distance measure 
was computed. The calculation took the form: 
D2 = (M - M )' W'1 (M - M ) 
a c a c 
where D2 = the distance measure of firm a from 
change firm c 
M = a four element vector of matching 
3 
47 
variables for firm a 
M = a four element vector of matching 
c variables for firm c 
W = the covariance matrix of the cross- 
section of matching variables 
W is based upon the pooled cross-section of change and 
nonchange firms. The changes identified and used in this 
study covered an eight year time span; W was computed for 
each individual year. 
All distance scores were arrayed in ascending order. 
p 
Pairs were assigned based upon D . Starting with the 
smallest D each score was examined to ascertain which 
change and nonchange firm gave rise to it. If the change 
firm had not yet been assigned a match and if the 
nonchange firm was not previously assigned to a change 
firm, a match was made. This process was repeated until 
all change firms were assigned a matched control group 
member. 
The D ^statistic can be thought of as a univariate 
measure of multidimensional differences. It is a natural 
extension of a Euclidean distance measure used by Martin 
et al, (1977), and is preferable to it in that the 
covariance structure among the matching variables is taken 
into consideration. 
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Dependent Variables 
This study takes a multivariate approach in examining 
the market reaction to accounting changes. Three 
dependent variables are used: CARs, changes in systematic 
risk and trading volume reaction. 
A later interpretation of the CARs will rest upon the 
jointly maintained hypotheses of semi-strong market 
efficiency and the descriptive validity of the 
Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Semi-strong market efficiency implies that security prices 
fully reflect all publicly available information. In 
operationalizing the concept of "fully reflect", one can 
assert that equilibrium prices (or expected returns) are 
established in accordance with the CAPM. The CAPM can be 
stated as: 
E (R ) = R + [E (R ) - R ]B . 
it f mt f 1 
where E(R ..) 
it 
the expected return on security i 
in period t 
R^ = the risk free rate 
E(R ) 
mt 
the expected return on the market 
portfolio in period t 
= the systematic risk of security i 
The assumptions that 1) market equilibrium can be 
stated in terms of expected returns and 2) equilibrium 
expected returns fully r 
information have an important 
based solely on publicly a 
result in expected returns 
expected returns. More forma 
e . , = 
it Rit - 
and E(e.,) 
it 
= 0 
where J = the information set 
Departures of e., from its 
it 
indication that the market 
information that necessit 
adjustment. 
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fleet publ i cly a v ailable 
implication: trad ing systems 
ailable info rmat ion cannot 
in excel 5S Of the equi 1ibrium 
ly, let 
availabl e at time t-1. 
expected value of zero is an 
has become aware o f new 
ted a equilibrating price 
Operationally, the natural log form of the market 
model is used. The market model can be stated as : 
R = a. 
it 1 
where R 
it 
R 
mt 
e., 
it 
b. R 
1 mt ’it 
the continuously compounded realized 
rate of return on security i in month t 
the continuously compounded realized 
rate of return on the market portfolio 
the intercept term 
the estimate of systematic risk 
a residual term that satisfies the OLS 
assumptions 
This particular form of the market model was chosen for 
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several reasons. It has enjoyed widespread use and will 
therefore make the results of this study more comparable 
to the results of past research efforts. Additionally, it 
has been shown by Collins and McKeown (1979) that this 
form of the market model is relatively free of 
specification error. 
Several studies (e.g., Abdel-khalik and Mckeown 
(1978b) and Elgers and Murray (1981a)) have shown that 
research results may be sensitive to the index used to 
serve as a proxy for the market portfolio. Accordingly, 
all tests were conducted twice using estimates of 
systematic risk generated by 1) the CRSP Equal Weighted 
Index (CEW) and 2) the CRSP Value Weighted Index (CVW). 
For each firm, a residual in each month of the test 
period was computed as: 
e. . = R. . - a . - b . R , it it ii mt 
The test period consists of ten months: the month of the 
fiscal year end in the year that the firm (or its 
matched-pair) made the change, the four preceeding months 
and the five succeeding months. The choice of a test 
period is essentially an arbitrary one. The objective is 
to select the period during which it is likely that the 
market became aware of the accounting change and its 
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effects on the firm. Since firms often disclose 
accounting changes in third or fourth quarter earnings 
reports, the four month period prior to year end was 
included in the test period. Detailed information 
concerning a change is likely to appear in annual earnings 
announcements, 10-K reports and annual reports. 
Accordingly the five months after the year end is included 
in the test period. 
For each of the two change and two nonchange groups, 
average residuals (ARs) and CARs were computed as follows: 
N 
AR, = (1/N)£e.t 
t £1 it 
where N = the number of firms in the group and 
5 
CAR = £AR 
t=^4 t 
where t = 0 is the month of the fiscal year end in 
the year in which the change was 
made 
Because of data availability problems, different 
estimation periods for the market model parameters were 
used for the two groups studied (i.e., the LIFO group and 
its associated matched control group and the SFAS No. 13 
changes plus the ITC changes and their control group) [5]. 
Parameters for firms in Experimental Group 1 and Control 
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Group 1 were estimated over three different time periods: 
1) 48 months prior to the test period, 2) 24 months both 
before and after the test period, and 3) 48 months after 
the test period. • The use of different estimation periods 
is motivated by the consideration that the accounting 
principle change as well as other factors could result in 
an unstable beta coefficient. A comparison of the test 
period CARs generated from parameters based on the three 
estimation periods permits an assessment of the 
sensitivity of the CARs to the use of different estimation 
periods. 
Only two estimation periods were used for 
Experimental Group 2 and Control Group 2. These periods 
consist of 1) 48 months before the test period and 2) 24 
months both before and after the test period. Since 
changes in response to SFAS No. 13 occured in 1977 and 
1978, 48 months of post-test period data is unavailable. 
As was done in the matching process, all betas were 
adjusted using Vasicek's procedure. The cross-sectional 
distribution used in the adjustment procedure was based 
upon the total cross-section of firms examined in this 
study, that is, Experimental Groups 1 and 2 and Control 
Groups 1 and 2. 
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As indicated previously, there is the possibility 
that an accounting principle change may influence the 
market’s perception of a firm's risk. For example, a 
change may indicate the entrance by a firm (or the 
expansion by a firm) in an industry. That is, management 
may be motivated to adopt the accounting principle that is 
dominant in that industry. Fama and Miller (1972) have 
developed a theory stating that expected return is a 
function of a firm’s production-investment decisions 
(which vary from industry to industry). To the extent 
that the beta coefficient is considered to be a surrogate 
for these decisions, a change in industry may result in a 
change in systematic risk. Moreover, it is not unlikely 
that a common factor may be responsible for both the 
accounting principle change and the change in systematic 
risk. For example, an increase in inventory costs may be 
partly responsible for management’s decision to switch to 
LIFO and a change in systematic risk. Finally, the change 
itself could be responsible for a change in systematic 
risk if it induces alterations in managerial behavior. 
Accordingly, a reassessment by the market of a firm's 
systematic risk in response to an accounting change is 
another indication that the change has information 
content. Therefore, change in systematic risk is used as 
a second dependent variable. For Experimental and Control 
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Group 1, it is defined as the Vasicek adjusted beta based 
on the four year estimation period subsequent to the test 
period less the Vasicek adjusted beta based on the four 
year estimation period prior to the test period. Due to 
data availability problems, two year estimation periods 
were used for Experimental and Control Group 2. 
The third dependent variable used in this study is 
trading volume. A significant CAR may be an indication of 
a homogeneous reassessment by the market of a firm’s 
equilibrium price. An information item could elicit no 
equilibrating price change, but still possess information 
content because it causes various reactions across 
different capital market participants. With respect to an 
equilibrating price change, the various reactions may tend 
to cancel each other out resulting in the absence of a 
significant CAR. Several researchers (Beaver (1968) and 
Foster (1973) among others) have suggested examining 
trading volume as a measure of differential reaction to 
items potentially possessing information content. 
Accordingly, trading volume is selected as the third 
dependent variable to be used in this study. 
In assessing the impact of an accounting principle 
change on trading volume, a time series model developed by 
Copeland (1979) was used. This model can be expressed as: 
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V . = -c + dV - fV 
it mt mt-1 
gV 
it-1 
h 
it 
where V . = the natural log of the number of 
lt shares traded of security i in 
month t divided by the number of 
trading days in month t 
V = the natural log of the number of 
shares traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange in month t 
divided by the number of 
trading days in month t 
c,d,f and g = parameters of the model for firm i 
h . = a residual term that satisfies the 
lt usual OLS assumptions 
The above model has more appeal than the simple one-factor 
model developed by Beaver (1968) for several reasons. 
First, it is not ad hoc, as is Beaver’s model. It is 
based upon assumptions regarding the effect of information 
arrival on trading volume. Additionally, there is 
evidence that the model employed here is less misspecified 
than Beaver’s model (see Copeland (1979)). 
Parameters of the model were estimated using 24 
monthly observations both before and after the test 
period. For each month in the test period, a residual was 
computed as follows: 
(-c + dV . - fV. , + gV. . . ) 
mt mt-1 it-1 
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Since may vary from firm to firm simply due to 
differences in the number of shares of stock outstanding, 
it must be standarized in some manner. Cne option might 
have been to divide each by the number of shares of 
firm i outstanding in month t. However, a measure of the 
number of shares outstanding is not available on a monthly 
basis. Therefore, the procedure used was to divide each 
h. by its standard deviation. Since h.f is essentially a 
forecast error, its standard deviation is the square root 
of the forecast error variance (see Appendix C, expression 
(ID). 
These standardized residuals were accumulated in the 
same manner that residuals from the market model were 
accumulated. 
Trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange as well 
as the number of trading days in each month were obtained 
from Standard and Poor’s Statistical Service. 
Hypotheses and Statistical Analyses 
For each of the two types of changes examined, 
separate analyses were conducted. The primary analysis 
consisted of a simultaneous comparison of the three 
dependent variables across the change and nonchange 
groups. Let d be a three element column vector of 
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differences in group centroids. The null hypothesis can 
be stated as: 
H : d = 0 
o 
That is, the null hypothesis states that there is no 
difference between the two groups when the three dependent 
variables are considered simultaneously. 
Univariate t tests are inappropriate for use in this 
study for several reasons. Overall interpretation of a 
series of univariate t tests is difficult. One 
significant t test may not indicate an overall difference 
between the two groups. Moreover, a number of nearly 
significant t statistics may indicate overall group 
differences. Secondly, univariate tests fail to consider 
the covariance structure of the dependent variables. 
This study utilized Hotelling’s T ^ ,which is the 
multivariate analog of the t test, to assess the multiple 
dimensions of group differences. A two sample approach is 
inappropriate since the control group is matched with the 
change group and is not independent of it. A one sample 
approach is utilized. T^is calculated as: 
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= N(d" C1 d) 
where N = the number of matched-pairs 
C = the sample covariance matrix of the difference 
scores 
Under the null hypothesis, 
((N-p)/p(n-1))T2 ' F P 
N-p 
where p = the number of dependent variables. 
An important issue that arises when overall 
differences are found between two groups concerns the 
identification of the dependent -variable(s) that 
contribute significantly toward the diffenence. As 
previously indicated, standard univariate t tests are 
inappropriate. These tests use the computed t statistic 
and the typical univariate t critical value (or its normal 
approximation). The multiple comparison procedure 
described in Morrison (1967) was used to assess the 
variables along which the groups differ. The test 
statistic used in this procedure is the univariate t 
statistic. However, the critical value used to reject the 
null hypothesis is modified so as to ensure that all 
individual tests on the dependent variables are 
simultaneously true at the desired Type I error level. 
The critical t value used in these tests is equal to the 
square root of the critical T^ value used in the 
multivariate test. 
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The only assumption of a one sample Hotelling's 
test is that of multivariate normality. Mardia (1975) has 
shown that Hotelling's T 2is robust with respect to this 
assumption, even with small sample sizes. 
There is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a CAR 
when a firm has experienced a change in systematic risk. 
In the absence of a beta shift, an abnormally large CAR is 
an indication of an information item resulting in a 
equilibrating price change. However, with a concurrent 
beta shift, the interpretation of CARs becomes more 
difficult. It is unclear as to what portions of the CARs 
are due to information effects or to the beta change. 
Accordingly, additional T^ tests were undertaken for 
stable beta firms only. These tests utilized two 
dependent variables: CARs and volume residuals. Unstable 
betas were detected by use of the Chow test. This 
procedure is described below when the ancillary tests are 
discussed . 
In addition to the primary tests outlined above, 
additional tests were conducted on an individual firm 
basis. These tests consisted of assessments of 1) beta 
stability via the Chow test, 2) departures of cumulative 
market model residuals from zero and 3) departures of 
cumulative volume residuals from zero. 
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The Chow test (see Johnston (1972)) is designed to 
detect beta shifts by examining the sums of squared error 
terms from three regressions: one based on data from 
before the event of interest, one based on the data from 
after the event of interest and one based on both sets of 
data. For Experimental and Control Group 1, these periods 
consisted of 1) the 48 months preceeding the test period, 
2) the 48 months subsequent to the test period and 3) the 
above two periods combined. The regression based upon the 
entire 96 observations was constructed so that the 
intercept term was allowed to vary from the first period 
to the second. The test statistic, which follows the F 
distribution, is: 
F = (S - S )/(S /(N -4)) 
where S = the sum of squared error terms from the 
^ regression fitted on the data from before 
and after the test period 
S = the sum of squared error terms from the two 
2 separately fitted regressions 
Due to lack of data, 24 month periods instead of 48 
month periods were used in assessing beta stability for 
Experimental and Control Group 2. 
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In assessing departures of market model residuals and 
volume model residuals from zero, it is necessary to 
utilize the proper variance estimate. In each case, since 
the test period was excluded from the estimation period, 
the residuals are more in the nature of forecast errors, 
and it is the forecast error variance which should be 
employed. Moreover, since cumulative residuals are 
tested, the cumulative forecast error variance must be 
used. Appendix C derives expressions for the cumulative 
forecast error variance in both the simple and multiple 
regression frameworks. 
A difficult econometrics issue has not yet been 
addressed. There is evidence that returns may be 
cross-sectionally correlated (King (1966)). In developing 
the CARs for each group, the residuals are added across 
firms. Because, of the cross-sectional dependence, 
residuals might not be considered to be independent 
drawings and the statistical tests suggested above are not 
strictly appropriate. Cross-sectional correlation is not 
a substantial problem in this study for several reasons. 
Residuals, not returns, are being used. The common market 
factor is removed from the return and this should reduce 
the correlation (see Beaver (1980)). Additionally, the 
changes took place across a variety of industries. This 
factor should also limit the cross-sectional correlation. 
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One final aspect of the research design should reduce any 
cross-sectional correlation. Because the control groups 
were selected on the basis of several matching variables, 
the experimental and control groups are not independent 
and difference scores of the residuals were used. The use 
of difference scores reduces the cross-sectional 
correlation in the following manner. Cross-sectional 
correlation results from firms experiencing common market, 
industry and other factors. Since each matched-pair is 
similar on a variety of relevant dimensions, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the factors causing the 
cross-sectional correlation have similar impacts on each 
member of the matched-pair. By taking difference scores, 
the effects of these factors cancel; the difference scores 
do not reflect the impact of those factors causing the 
cross-sectional correlation and these scores approach 
independence 
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Footnotes 
1. This is the same definition as used by Basu 
(1978). 
2. See, for example, Kessel (1956). 
3. Bowman (1980) has provided evidence which does 
not support the hypothesized superiority of 
measuring debt at market value. 
4. The test period is defined in the next section. 
5. Hereafter, LIFO changes will be referred to as 
Experimental Group 1 and their matched-pairs as 
Control Group 1. ITC changes and SFAS No. 13 
changes will be referred to as Experimental Group 
2 and their matched-pairs as Control Group 2. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Sample 
Experimental Groups. 131 firms that switched to LIFO met 
the sample selection criteria of the study. However 
suitable matches could not be found for three firms. This 
resulted in a final sample of 128 firms. All change and 
nonchange firms that were examined in this study are 
listed in Appendix B. Table 2 contains information 
regarding the industry grouping of Experimental Group 1. 
As would be expected, the major portion of the sample 
consists of manufacturing firms. While a wide array of 
manufacturing groups are represented, certain groups 
dominate the sample. The most dominant groups are 
chemicals and allied products, paper and allied products 
and petrol eum refining and related industries. 
It is somewhat surprising that no members of the 
wholesale or retail industries are members of the sample. 
In part, this can be explained by the sample constraint 
that a firm switching to LIFO and making a change in 
response to SFAS No. 13 or changing to the flow-through 
method of accounting for the ITC be excluded from the 
study. A review of Table 4, which summarizes the industry 
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grouping of Experimental Group 2, indicates that a number 
of firms making changes in response to SFAS No. 13 were 
wholesalers of retailers. 
Table 3 summarizes the chronological distribution of 
the LIFO changes. The vast majority of the LIFO switches 
took place in 1974. The grouping of many of the changes 
in one year tends to reduce the external validity of the 
study and also underscores the need for a careful 
matching. 
Experimental Group 2 is comprised of 22 firms. Four 
firms changed to the flow-through method of accounting for 
the ITC and 18 changed their lease accounting in response 
to SFAS No. 13. The industry breakdown of Experimental 
Group 2 is provided in Table 4. The industry distribution 
is fairly broad-based. Manufacturers of food and kindred 
products account for the most dominant proportion of the 
sample. 
The chronological distribution of Experimental Group 
2 is provided in Table 5. All SFAS No. 13 changes took 
place in 1977 or 1978. As with Experimental Group 1, the 
chronological distribution of Group 2 is not as uniform 
over the years studied as would be desirable. 
66 
Control Groups. Matched firms for the control groups were 
selected based upon 1) appropriate industry membership and 
2 
2) the D statistic described in Chapter IV. To provide a 
basis for assessment of the success of the matching 
process, Tables 6, 7 and 8 describe the cross-sectional 
characteristics of the matching variables for Experimental 
Groups 1 and 2 and all potential candidates for inclusion 
in the control group, respectively. 
The mean leverage of the potential control group 
members seems high by historical standards. However, the 
time series behavior of leverage displayed in Table 8 
reveals that this variable has generally increased over 
the eight year period of this study. Moreover, Bowman 
(1980) reports that the average leverage for his sample of 
92 firms, based on 1973 data, was 1.44 which is not too 
far from the mean (or the median) of the 1973 data in 
Table 8. 
Table 8 also reveals an average earnings yield that 
appears rather low. The Wall Street Journal, for example, 
reports average earnings yields for the 30 Dow Jones 
Industrials of .093 and .156 as of January 3, 1974 and 
January 3, 1975, respectively ( The Wall Street Journal, 
January 6, 1975, p.25). This difference potentially can 
be attributed to COMPUSTAT bias. The firms on COMPUSTAT 
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are the older, more established business institutions that 
t 
may be able to command a high premium for every dollar of 
earnings. However, the Dow Jones stocks are also older, 
established business institutions. One other explanation 
for the above differences may be that the COMPUSTAT data 
base includes a number of firms other than industrials 
which may result in noncomparable samples. 
A comparison of Tables 6 and 8 reveals that 
Experimental Group 1 was characterized by larger 
unexpected earnings changes, higher, earnings yield and 
lower leverage and systematic risk. Larger increases in 
earnings on the part of the LIFO group corroborates 
Brown's (1980) findings. These larger earnings probably 
also account for the higher earnings yield of the LIFO 
group. 
As mentioned previously, 131 firms that switched to 
% 
LIFO and that had data sufficient for purposes of this 
study were indentified. However, suitable matches could 
be found for only 128 firms. One firm was eliminated 
because no match was found and two firms were elimated 
because their best statistic was substantially greater 
than any other score of the firms included in the 
control group [1]. 
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Table 9 summarizes the characteristics of the 
matching variables for Control Group 1. As can be seen, 
on each of the matching variables, Control Group 1 is 
closer to Experimental Group 1, in terms of both mean and 
median, -than are all possible members of the control group 
based upon the data from all years. 
Since over 90% of the LIFO changes took place in 
197^, it may be more relevant to compare Tables 6 and 9 
with the 1974 data in Table 8. This comparison results in 
the same conclusions as those reached in the preceeding 
paragraph. 
With regard to Experimental Group 2, a comparison of 
Table 7 and the data based upon all years in Table 8 
indicates that Experimental Group 2 has substantially 
larger unexpected earnings changes, lower earnings yield 
and leverage in terms of means but higher earnings yield 
and leverage in terms of medians, and lower systematic 
risk. Table 10 reports the matching variable statistics 
for Control Group 2. For all matching variables, the 
means of Control Group 2 are closer to the means of 
Experimental Group 2 than are the means of all potential 
control group members (Table 8). In terms of medians, the 
above conclusions hold for only unexpected changes in 
earnings and earnings yield. 
69 
Since most of Experimental Group 2 changes took place 
in one year, 1977, it may be more relevant to compare 
Tables 7 and 10 with the 1977 data in Table 8. This 
comparison yields the same conclusions as those reached in 
the above paragraph. 
In summary, the above comparisons support the 
contention that the matching process yielded control 
groups more similar to the experimental groups in terms of 
the matching variables than would have been obtained by 
random sampling procedures. Additional comparisons were 
conducted, however, to further investigate the degree of 
similarity between the experimental and control groups. 
Hotelling’s T^ tests were conducted between each 
experimental group and its control group. These results 
are reported in Table 11. Usually in the case of two 
related groups, the one sample test is appropriate since 
this approach recognizes the correlation between the 
groups on the test variables. The one sample test for 
Group 1 is significant at less than the .01 level, 
indicating substantial differences between Experimental 
and Control -Group 1 on the matching variables. Based upon 
this test, it seems that the matching procedure was not as 
successful as was hoped. The one sample test for Group 2 
is not significant at the .05 level, indicating no 
significant differences between the two groups. 
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When two related groups are examined, generally the 
relationship between the two groups arised from matching 
on variables other than the test variables. In the 
present case however, the matching variables are the test 
variables. The matching process virtually assures a high 
correlation between the two groups on the test variables. 
This has the effect of reducing the magnitude of the 
inverse of the variance-covariance structure, thus making 
the test more sensitive. In fact, the more successful the 
matching process is, the more difficult it is to conclude, 
based upon a one sample test, that the experimental and 
control groups do not differ. Since the matching process 
may be biasing the one sample test in the direction of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference, the two 
sample test might be more appropriate. This test 
indicates that neither set of groups differs on the 
matching variables at any reasonable significance level. 
The final comparison made to assess the success of 
the matching process relates to the l£ statistic. Table 
12 presents a summary of the scores. In terms of mean, 
median and maximum value, the D^scores for each set of 
experimental and control groups is substantially below the 
corresponding figure for the entire cross-section of D 
scores. Based upon this and the preceeding comparison, 
each experimental group and its control group seem to be 
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fairly similar in-terms of the matching variables. 
The var iable s which served as the basi s for the 
com putation of the scores were selec ted in large part 
for the im pact they might have on the CARs . To 
inv estigate this issue, cross-sectional r egre ssions were 
per formed wi th CARs as the dependent v ariabl e and the 
mat ching var iable s as the independent var iables . Sepa rate 
reg ressions were run for Experimental and Contr ol Grou P 1 
and Expe rimental and Control Group 2. These results are 
reported in Table 13. The results of these regress ions 
are not impressi ve for either set of firms. The R-square 
for Group 1 amoun ts to .048 while the R-square for Group 2 
is . 173. While the Group 1 regression is sig nifican t at 
les s than the .05 level, the strength of the r elation ship 
in terms of expla ined variation is rather weak. 
It would have been more reassuring had the matching 
variable s explai ned more of the var iation in the CARs. 
Such a r esult wou Id have stren gthened the support for 
matching on the se variables. In any event, the matching 
process does he IP ensure tha t any diffe rences found 
between an exper imental and con trol group wi th respect to 
the CARs cannot be attributed to d ifferences in the 
matching variable s. 
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While the matching variables were selected primarily 
because of the impact they potentially could have upon the 
CARs, it is quite plausible that they could also affect 
changes in systematic risk. Blume (1971) shows, for 
example, that the magnitude of systematic risk is related 
to the stability of systematic risk. Accordingly, changes 
in systematic risk were also regressed on the matching 
variables for each group of firms. These results are 
reported in Table 14. The explanatory power of the 
regressions is fairly high; regressions for Group 1 and 
Group 2 have R-squares of .187 and .203, respectively. In 
both cases, systematic risk possesses significant marginal 
explanatory power. It seems, therefore, that with respect 
to the beta change dependent variable it was important to 
undertake the matching process. 
Market Model Regressions 
Table 15 cont 
r egre ;ssions for 
each of the two g 
six regres s ions 
(CVW or CEW) and 
the test period 
period and 48 mon 
stati Lstics r epor 
results of other 
ains the results 
Experimental and 
roups, six regress 
resulted from v 
the estimation per 
, 24 months on 
ths after the te 
ted in Table 14 
studies. R-square 
of th e market model 
Contr ol Group 1. For 
ions we re run . These 
arying the mark et index 
iod (48 months b efore 
either si de of the test 
st per iod). All the 
are in line with the 
s of approximately 
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are typical of the explanatory power usually achieved by 
the market model. Also notice that betas generated by 
using the CVW index are uniformly greater than their CEW 
index counterparts. Similar results have been found by 
Elgers and Murray (1981b). 
One other interesting aspect of the results reported 
in Table 15 relates to the R-squares. The R-squares 
generated by using the CEW index are uniformly larger than 
those resulting from the use of the CVW index. This 
result again corroborates the findings of Elgers and 
Murray (1981b) and lends support for the use of CEW betas 
in the matching process. 
The results of the market model regressions for 
Experimental and Control Group 2 are reported in Table 16. 
Eight regressions were run for each group. These eight 
regressions resulted from varying the index (CVW or CEW) 
and the time period used for parameter estimation. The 
four periods were: 1) 48 months prior to the test period, 
2) 24 months on either side of the test period, 3) 24 
months prior to the test period and 4) 24 months after the 
test period. Regressions based upon 48 months of 
post-test period data could not be run because of data 
availability problems. The two regressions based on two 
years of pre-test period data and two years of post-test 
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period data were run because of the need to base the beta 
change dependent variable on them. 
The comments made above regarding Table 15 generally 
hold for the results reported in Table 16. The only 
surprising aspect of Table 16 relates to the R-squares. 
They are generally quite high, particularly for the 
regressions based upon the two year time span subsequent 
to the test period. It’s likely that these results are a 
function of 1) the particular firms in the sample and 2) 
the specific time period used. 
Trading Volume Model 
The regression results of Copeland’s volume model are 
reported in Table 17. The model’s derivation implies that 
the sign of the intercept term and coefficient f should be 
negative whereas the sign of the other ,two coefficients 
should be positive. With the exception of the intercept 
terms for Experimental and Control Group 2, all 
coefficients have the appropriate sign. Moreover, the 
model did a fairly good job of explaining the variability 
in trading volume; the R-squares ranged from .355 to .424. 
These figures are not'quite as good as Copeland (1979) 
reports, but he was using weekly data. The R-squares 
obtained in this study do exceed those usually obtained 
using Beaver’s (1968) model. 
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Tests of Hypotheses 
Experimental and Control Group 1. The degree of 
dissimilarity between the sample firms changing to LIFO 
and their matched-pairs on the three dependent variables 
was assessed by using Hotelling's T^ The primary results 
are reported in Table 18. As Table 18 indicates, 
Hotelling's T was performed six times by varying the 
estimation period for the betas used to generate the CARs 
and also by employing both the CVW and CEW index. Only 
one of these six tests yielded a significant test 
statistic. That test employed the CEW index and an 
estimation period consisting of the 2U months both before 
and after the test period. 
The null hypoythesis of no information content being 
associated with a LIFO switch cannot be rejected in five 
of the six cases reported in Table 18 and can be rejected 
in one of them. It appears that the research results of 
this study are sensitive to both the index selected to 
represent the market portfolio and the time period used to 
estimate beta. The sensitivity of the results to the 
index can partially be explained by a difference in the 
beta movements of the experimental vs. the control group 
within each of the two indexes. When the CVW index is 
used, the experimental and the control group exhibit an 
approximately equal decrease in beta (.093 and .075, 
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respectively) which resulted in a univariate t value of 
-•53• However, when the CEW index was employed, the groups 
moved in opposite directions. The beta of the 
experimental group decreased by .004 while the beta of the 
control group increased by .035. This difference resulted 
in a univariate t value of -1.46. The difference between 
the beta change of each group is greater when the CEW is 
used and this is likely to contribute toward obtaining 
statistically significant differences when using the 
multivariate T2test. 
The above is also likely to explain the sensitivity 
of the results to the time period used to estimate the 
betas employed to generate the CARs. For both indexes, 
the separation between the CARs of the experimental and 
control group is the greatest for the estimation period of 
24 months both before and after the test period. For the 
CEW index, this separation plus the difference between the 
groups with respect to the beta change was sufficient to 
yield a significant T2 test. Also note that while the 
magnitude of the difference in the CARs for the two groups 
varies over the three estimation periods for each index, 
the pattern of the movement is quite similar for each 
index. That is, the largest difference in the CARs 
occurred in the estimation period composed of two years 
both before and after the test period for both indexes. 
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In the one case where a significant difference 
between the two groups was found, multiple comparison 
tests were conducted. A significant T2 ensures that at 
least one linear compound of differences in group 
centroids is significantly different from zero. Since the 
objective here is to assess which of the dependent 
variables promoted the significant T? > only simple 
compounds were tested • That is, three multiple comparison 
tests were conducted; in each test, weight was given to 
only one dependent variable. None of these tests was 
significant at an alpha level of .05. Additional multiple 
comparisons were not undertaken since the linear compounds 
which would serve as the basis of these tests would lack 
interpretability. Accordingly, univariate t statistics 
were examined to obtain a sense of which dependent 
variables were most responsible for the significant T2. 
From this examination it is apparent that the CARs were 
"driving” the statistic to significance. The 
univariate t statistic on the CARs was -2.19 while the t 
statistics for the beta change and the volume residuals 
were -1.46 and .62, respectively. 
The conventional wisdom would posit that a LIFO 
change would be accompanied by a favorable stock market 
reaction. This favorable reaction would be due to the 
positive impact that a LIFO switch would have on the 
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firm’s cash flow because of the tax consequences of the 
accounting change. However, that is not what the results 
in Table 18 indicate. In all of the tests reported upon 
in Table 18, the CARs of the experimental group are 
negative and lower than the CARs of the control group. 
These results directly conflict with those of Ball (1972) 
and Sunder (1973; 1975). They do, however, agree with the 
results of Brown (1980) who, unlike Ball and Sunder, 
examined LIFO switches occurring during the same time 
frame as those in this study. A subsequent section of 
this chapter provides a rationale for a negative market 
reaction to a LIFO switch and reports the results of an 
empirical test of that proposition. 
Because of the difficulty in interpreting a CAR when 
systematic risk is unstable, additional T^ tests on the 
CARS and volume residuals were conducted using only those 
firms exhibiting stable betas. Stability was assessed 
using the Chow test. The results of the T2 tests on this 
sample of firms are reported in Table 19 and are quite 
similar to the results reported in Table 18. Only one of 
the six tests, the test using the CEW index and an 
estimation period of 24 months both before and after the 
test period, yielded a T2 significant at the .05 level. 
Again as before, although the multiple comparison 
procedure applied to each dependent variable resulted in 
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no statistically significant test statistic, an 
examination of the univariate t values indicates that it 
is the CARs which primarily contributed to the significant 
T2. 
Experimental and Control Group 2. Hotelling’s T2 tests 
were used to assess the degree of dissimilarity between 
Experimental Group 2 and Control Group 2 on the three 
dependent variables. Four tests were performed. The data 
for these tests were generated by varying the market index 
(CVW and CEW) and the period used to estimate the betas 
employed to generate the CARs (four years predceeding the 
test period and two years on either side of the test 
period). These results are presented in Table 20. As 
expected, none of the tests are significant. Moreover, 
not one of the univariate tests are significant. 
The results of conducting T2 tests on stable beta 
p 
firms only are presented in Table 21. Mo significant T 
was found. 
Based upon the above statistics, the null hypothesis 
of no information content being associated with 
Experimental Group 2 changes cannot be rejected. Changes 
of this type elicited no observable stock market reaction. 
Note that the analyses of Groups 1 and 2 are not 
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directly comparable since the beta change dependent 
variable is based on a four year estimation period for 
Group 1 and a two year estimation period for Group 2. 
Additional tests were conducted on Group 1 data using a 
two year estimation period to compute systematic risk 
changes. No important differences were found between 
these tests and those reported upon in Tables 18 and 19. 
SF AS No. 13 Changes. Tests identical to the ones 
conducted for Group 2 were separately applied to the 18 
firms in Group 2 making changes in response to SFAS No. 
13. The results of these tests are reported in Tables 22 
and 23. Not one of the T? test statistics is significant 
at an alpha level of .05. These results indicate that the 
null hypothesis of no information content cannot be 
rejected. 
An analysis of the univariate t statistics does, 
however, reveal one significant statistic at the .05 level 
(when significance is assessed in the univariate manner). 
This t value of -2.25 is reported in Table 23 and arises 
from a test of equality of the CARs of stable beta firms 
by employing the CEW index and an estimation period 
consisting of two years on either side of the test period. 
The CARs of the change group are negative and 
significantly lower than those of the control group. This 
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is some indication of an adverse market reaction to 
changes induced by SFAS No. 13. 
Firm Level Analysis 
Analyses were also conducted on a firm by firm basis. 
These tests assessed 1) beta stability, 2) departures of 
CARs from zero and 3) departures of cumulative volume 
residuals from zero. The results are displayed in Table 
24. Experimental and Control Group 1 seem to differ on 
two accounts. Five firms from Experimental Group 1 
exhibited CARs significantly less than zero while only two 
firms from its control group did. This result tends to 
support the results of the cross-sectional analysis. 
Additionally, firms changing to LIFO were characterized by 
a higher degree of beta instability. Thirteen 
experimental and only three control firms were 
characterized by unstable betas. No firms in either group 
were characterized by abnormally large volume residuals. 
The results for Experimental and Control Group 2 are 
identical, while the results for SFAS No. 13 changes and 
their control group are almost identical. These results 
again support the cross-sectional analysis. 
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Declining Profit Margin Hypothesis- 
As an earlier section of this chapter indicated, firms 
in the sample that switched to LIFO were characterized by 
lower CARs than were the control group. This is an 
indication of an adverse reaction on the part of capital 
market participants. This runs counter to the widely held 
belief that a rational investor would react favorably to a 
LIFO switch because of the improvement in the firm’s cash 
flow which results from the tax benefits of the change. 
If the hypothesis of market efficiency is still 
maintained, other factors might explain the market’s 
negative reaction to a LIFO switch. 
Tax benefits will only accrue to a firm if its per 
unit inventory costs are rising. It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that firms switching to LIFO either 
are or are anticipating experiencing increases in their 
unit inventory costs. To the extent that the competitive 
position of the firm permits it to correspondingly 
increase its unit selling price, the firm may not have 
incurred any substantial negative result due to the price 
rise. However, negative consequences would result for the 
firm if it is unable to sufficiently modify its unit 
selling price in the face of rising inventory costs. 
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The above forms the basis of a potential explanation 
of the negative market reaction to LIFO changes. A LIFO 
change may have been an indication to the market that 
management anticipates sizable increases in unit inventory 
costs. Armed with this signal and their view of the 
competitive position of the firm, capital market 
particiapnts may have concluded that many of the firms 
switching to LIFO would not be able to sufficiently adjust 
their unit selling prices in response to increased 
inventory costs. 
The above proposition was tested in two ways. First 
the average change in the cost of goods sold percentage 
(CGS %) for the LIFO group was compared with the same 
variable for the control group via a one sample t test. 
The CGS % is reflective of the spread between average unit 
cost and average unit selling price. A cost increase that 
is not offset by a proportional rise in the selling price 
would result in an increased CGS %. The objective of this 
test is to ascertain if the LIFO group experienced an 
increase in its costs which it could (or would) not pass 
along to its customers via increased selling prices. The 
test was done twice, once where the change in the CGS % 
was measured as the CGS % in the year before the change 
less the CGS % in the year of the change and once more 
where the change in the CGS % was measured as the CGS % in 
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the year of th e change le ss the CGS % in the year a f ter 
the chang e [2] • These resul ts are repo rted in Table 25. 
A o ne s ided tes t was used since the a priori e xpectation 
is that the ex perimental group ex perienced gre ater 
incr eases in the CGS % than the contro 1 group. Note that 
given the way in which the variables were d efined , a 
nega it ive chan ge in the CGS % implies an incre ase in the 
CGS % from one ye ar to the n ext. In both per iods , the 
experimental group’s CGS % increased significantly more 
than did the control group's percentage at better than the 
.05 level. These results are strong indications that the 
firms switchi ng to LIFO experi enced increased i nventory 
costs that they were unable to pass along to their 
customers via incre ased selling prices • 
One further te st was perfo rmed to assess the degree 
to wh ich the market util .ized the signa Is regarding changes 
in th e CGS %. If the market is using this information in 
valuing securities, some degree of positive association 
would be expected between CARs and changes in the CGS %. 
Accordingly, CARs were correlated with CGS % changes on a 
cross-sectional basis for those firms switching to LIFO. 
Since Deakin (1976) has shown that certain accounting 
ratios do not follow the normal distribution, both Pearson 
and rank-order correlations were calculated. These 
correlations were calculated three times, one for each 
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definition of the change in the CGS % and once where the 
two measures of the change in the CGS % was combined. The 
latter approach was accomplished by 1) regressing the CARs 
on both CGS % change variables and 2) correlating the CARs 
with the estimated values from this regression. The 
results are reported in Table 26. In the first period, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient has the appropriate 
sign but is not significant at the .05 level. Both 
rank-order correlations are significant at the .05 level. 
The results for the second period are quite consistent 
across all three correlations. The correlations between 
the CARs and the change in the CGS % from the year of the 
change to the year following the change are .415, .375, 
and .263 for the Pearson, Spearman, and Kendall 
correlations, respectively. They are all significant at 
the .001 level. All correlations from the combined model 
are also significant at the .001 level. This can be 
interpreted as evidence supporting the notion that capital 
market participants utilized the signal from the LIFO 
switch in forming expectations regarding movements in the 
CGS % and valued securities based upon these expectations. 
Competing explanations will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
The fact that the market reacted negatively to the 
LIFO changes because of their signal regarding increased 
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inventory costs does not necessarily rule out the 
possibility that the market reacted positively to the tax 
benefits associated with LIFO switches. A favorable 
response to the tax benefits may have been overwhelmed by 
the adverse reaction to increased factor costs. To 
investigate this possibility, a covariance analysis was 
attempted where the change in CGS % served as the 
covariate and CARs served as the dependent variable. A 
necessary condition of covariance analysis is that the 
experimental and control groups respond in a uniform 
manner to the covariate. Unfortunetly, this was found not 
$ 
to be the case; use of covariance analysis in the present 
situation is therefore inappropriate. 
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Footnotes 
p 
1. These two firms had D scores of approximately 25 
and 90. Table 12 provides statistics on the D2 
scores obtained in this study. 
2. In order for the CGS % to be computed via a 
consistent inventory method, the CGS % for each 
LIFO change firm was adjusted to reflect the 
effect of the inventory change when the change in 
the CGS % was measured as the CGS % in the year 
before the change less the CGS % in the year of 
the change. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Objective. A number of previous studies have shown that 
financial statement users do not respond in a uniform 
manner to all types of accounting principle changes. 
However, APB Opinion No. 20 requires essentially uniform 
disclosures for all changes in accounting principles. 
Since financial statement users do not view all accounting 
principle changes as being equivalent, the proposition 
that all changes should be accounted for indentically is 
not compelling. 
An alternative approach would be to tailor the 
disclosure requirements for each type of change so that 
the information that is most relevant to financial 
statement users for each type of change is disclosed. A 
necessary element of this approach is the identification 
of a typology of accounting principle changes. The 
typology should be structured so that an a priori argument 
can be asserted as to why each type of change might have 
relevance for financial statement users. The delineation 
of the reasons why a change might have relevance for 
financial statement users can then be the basis for 
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accounting disclosure recommendations. 
The typology used in this study employed the economic 
significance/no economic significance dichotomy in 
classifying accounting principle changes. It was 
suggested that since financial statement users are 
concerned with making economic decisions, only accounting 
principle changes possessing economic significance would 
be relevant to them. If this is the case, then only 
disclosures related to these accounting principle changes 
need be made. 
There are substantial costs incurred by firms in 
generating, accumulating and communicating accounting 
disclosures to financial statement users. The users, in 
turn, incur substantial information processing costs. A 
rationale often used to justify costly accounting 
disclosures is that of information content. If it can be 
shown that certain types of accounting principle changes 
are not relevant to financial statement users, then 
requiring disclosures related to these changes must rest 
on other grounds. 
It was also suggested that an accounting principle 
change could have economic significance for four reasons: 
1) the change itself has economic significance, 2) the 
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change has an indirect economic impact via its effect on 
managerial behavior, 3) the change is associated with 
events having economic significance or the change 
provides financial statement users with accounting numbers 
that were previously unavailable and that are useful to 
capital market participants in assessing the risk-return 
relationship of the firm. 
The objective of this research was to assess the 
relevance (information content) to financial statement 
users of certain accounting principle changes which on an 
a priori basis were thought to belong to one of the two 
elements of the dichotomy. LIFO changes were thought to 
have economic significance due to the tax consequences 
associated with a LIFO switch. Changes to the 
flow-through method of accounting for the ITC and changes 
induced by SFAS No. 13 were thought not to be relevant to 
financial statement users because they are not 
characterized by any of the four scenarios described above 
as to why a change might have economic significance. 
A number of earlier studies have investigated the 
changes examined here. Confidence in the results of these 
studies is somewhat limited due to shortcomings in their 
research designs. Two elements of the research design 
employed in this study largely circumvented the problems 
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encountered in the previous projects. Cne measure taken 
was a matching process that helped ensure that the change 
and nonchange groups were similar on a variety of 
dimensions that may have affected the dependent variables. 
Additionally, a multivariate test of significance was used 
to assess differences between the change and nonchange 
groups on the three dependent variables. 
Results and Implications. The results of Hotelling's 
and univariate t tests indicated that the market reacted 
adversely to the LIFO changes examined in this study. 
This result conflicts with the a priori expectation that 
financial statement users would react positively to LIFC 
changes because of the associated tax savings. 
Significant correlations between the CARs and changes in 
the CGS ? suggest that the LIFC switches provided signals 
to capital market participants regarding current and 
future increases in inventory costs and that it was these 
signals that accounted for the negative market reaction. 
The above results indicate that LIFC changes possess 
information content for capital market participants. 
However, the source of the information content is not 
related solely to tax savings. The relevance of the LIFO 
changes to capital market participants was, in part, a 
function of the changes being signals regarding increased 
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factor costs which could not be passed along to the 
consumer. Thus LIFO changes were found to have information 
content and therefore to be worthy of disclosure, but not 
for the reasons originally expected. 
None of the tests conducted on Experimental Group 2 
indicated a market reaction. The absence of a market 
reaction is indicative of the irrelevance of Group 2 
changes to capital market participants. However, when 
only the SFAS No. 13 changes were examined, one 
significant t statistic (in a univariate sense) was found. 
This statistic resulted from a test of the equality of the 
CARs of stable beta firms. Moreover, in all tests 
involving SFAS No. 13 changes, the CARs of the change 
group were below those of the matched control group. This 
provides a limited amount of evidence indicating an 
adverse market reaction. If a negative reaction does in 
fact exist, one possible cause is that the market may have 
anticipated altered managerial behavior as a result of 
SFAS No. 13* Certain leases were required to be 
capitalized as a result of SFAS No. 13 that were not 
previously capitalized. Because of this, some firms may 
be close to (or actually in) violation of debt covenant 
restrictions. Management may be motivated to change the 
firm’s capital structure or to undertake other measures in 
order to avoid the covenant violations. 
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On a broader level, the results of this research pose 
serious questions to those conducting capital market based 
research. This area of research has evolved such that a 
large number of essentially arbitrary decisions must be 
made, all of which may influence the results of a study. 
Some of the issues that needed to be addressed in this 
study were: 
1. identification of suitable matching dimensions 
and an appropriate matching process to be used in 
the selection of control groups 
2. choice of the market model 
3. length of the estimation period 
4. choice of beta adjustment technique (if any) 
5. choice of market proxy 
6. choice of the test period 
7. positioning of the estimation period with respect 
to the test period. 
Decisions regarding the first four issues were made 
by appealing to the literature in the area. The 
literature concerning the other three issues is, at best, 
quite sparce. Choice of the test period was based upon 
knowledge of the timing of corporate earnings 
announcements and annual report issuance dates. There is 
some evidence that market proxy can affect research 
conclusions but only limited evidence regarding the 
preferability of market indexes. The safest approach in 
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this situation was to employ two widely used indexes. It 
was found that in terms of the LIFO T2 tests, the results 
were sensitive to the choice of index. Similarly, the 
p 
LIFO T c tests were found to be sensitive to the selection 
of the estimation period. 
The dangers that these results imply for capital 
market researchers are the following. The greater the 
number of arbitrary decisions to which research inferences 
are sensitive, the less comparable are a cross-section of 
studies if these studies have taken different paths in 
these situations. For example, the results of a study 
using the CEW index may not be comparable to the results 
of a study using the CVW index. Unfortunetly, the 
situation is not much improved if researchers follow the 
course of conducting their analyses simultaneously under a 
variety of options. It is likely that the results will 
not be consistent across options. This will hamper the 
possibility of drawing unambiguous conclusions from the 
results. In the absence of theoretical or empirical 
guidance concerning the choices outlined above, there does 
not seem to be an appealing solution to the problem. 
Limitations 
As with any empirical research project, certain 
compromises were necessitated in the execution of this 
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study which resulted in various limitations. Perhaps the 
most significant limitation is one that characterizes all 
ex post studies, the effect of uncontrolled confounding 
variables. While a great deal of effort was taken to 
eliminate a number of potentially confounding variables 
via the matching process, it is far from certain that all 
such variables were controlled for. In fact, it is likely 
that not all confounding variables were identified and 
controlled. 
This limitation has important implications for the 
results of the LIFO analysis. Earlier it was concluded 
that LIFO changes acted as a signal regarding current and 
future increases in inventory costs that could not be 
passed along to customers. However, the possibility 
exists that the market became aware of the inventory cost 
increases from other information sources. For example, 
commodity prices as well as the outlook for these prices 
frequently appear in The Wall Street Journal. Therefore, 
the adverse market reaction that was found in this study 
is not a conclusive indication of signals being conveyed 
to the market via the accounting changes. 
Another limitation relates to the time specific 
nature of the results of this study. Each of the two 
groups of changes examined in this study occurred during a 
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very short period of time. Most of the LIFO changes took 
place in the 1974-1975 time period and all of the SFAS No. 
13 changes took place in 1977 or early 1978. The time 
period during which the LIFO changes took place was 
characterized by a recession, high interest rates and 
* 
substantial inflation. It is likely that capital market 
participants were highly sensitive to issues involving 
increasing costs during this period. As the high 
association between the CARs and changes in the CGS % 
indicates, financial statement users used the signal from 
the LIFO switch in forming expectations regarding 
increases in factor costs which could not be passed along 
to consumers. It is not clear that the same result would 
hold in an environment characterized by lower inflation 
and, quite likely, lessened sensitivity to inflationary 
issues on the part of capital market participants. 
« 
Another limitation is associated with Experimental 
Group 2 and the SFAS No. 13 changes. The size of both 
groups was small, 22 and 18, respectively. This greatly 
reduces the likelihood of discovering any difference 
between the experimental and control groups when, in fact, 
they do exist. 
One final limitation characterizes this study as well 
as much of the capital market based research. An 
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examination of CARs and changes in systematic risk is an 
analysis of aggregate behavior. It does not consider the 
effect of accounting disclosures on individual investor 
behavior. To the extent that accounting policy makers 
wish to base their decisions on the impact of accounting 
numbers on individual financial statement users, market 
based studies are not particularly relevant to them. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
There are two obvious avenues for future research 
regarding LIFO changes. One would be the examination of 
LIFO changes taking place in time periods other than the 
one studied here. Ball (1972) and Sunder (1973; 1975) 
examined LIFO changes in earlier periods. When sufficient 
market based data becomes available, examination of more 
recent changes would be desirable. 
Another direction which future research could take is 
the expansion of the set of matching variables used to 
select the control group. One additional variable that 
could be used is the change in the CGS %. The possibility 
exists that the market did react positively to the tax 
benefits associated with the LIFO changes, but this 
reaction could have been overshadowed by the adverse 
reaction to increased factor costs. By matching on the 
change in the CGS %1 this proposition could be tested. 
98 
With respect to SFAS No. 13 changes, this study 
found some faint evidence of a market reaction. Since 
there is the possibility that management may have altered 
their decisions as a result of SFAS No. 13, and since 
this managerial reaction may be the basis of a market 
reaction, the impact of SFAS No. 13 on managerial 
behavior is an issue worth addressing. 
Another path of research worth pursuing is an 
investigation of other accounting principle changes in 
order to ascertain where in the typology described in 
Chapter III they belong. For example, do changes in 
depreciation method primarily affect managerial behavior 
or do they merely provide a new view of economic reality 
to financial statement users? Additionally, more thought 
should be given to the nature of the disclosures that 
should be made for the various types of accounting 
principle changes. 
One final comment is in order regarding empirical 
research projects whose objective is to assess the 
information content of various accounting disclosures. In 
the face of criticisms regarding their external validity, 
laboratory experiments have receded from view and have 
been replaced by capital market based projects as the 
primary research mode used to assess the impact of 
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accounting numbers on financial statement users. Perhaps 
the pendulum has swung too far. While market based 
studies rank high on the external validity scale, they are 
also characterized by severe limitations: uncontrolled 
variables, a focus on aggregate behavior and an 
examination of only one group of financial statement users 
(common stockholders). Since in large part the strengths 
(weaknesses) of laboratory studies are the weaknesses 
(strengths) of market based studies, these two approaches 
complement one another and both, therefore, deserve a 
place as a viable option open to accounting researchers. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 1 
Comparison of Earnings Per Share 1972-1976 
Year 
Change 
1974 
Companies 
1975 
Non change 
Companies 
Significance . 
Level 
(1974 Firms) 
1972 $1.81 — $1.53 NS 
1973 2.43 $2.38 1.95 .05 
1974 2.94 2.36 2.27 .05 
1974* 3.56 — 2.27 .001 
1975 2.55 1.99 2.10 NS 
1975* — 2.25 — — 
1976 — 3.74 — — 
*Earnings per share assuming that change companies had not changed 
to LIFO. 
Source: Brown (1980) 
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Table 2 
Experimental Group 1 - Industry Composition 
Industry Group Number of Firms 
Metal Mining 3 
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining 1 
Oil and Gas Extraction 1 
Construction Other Than Building Construction - 
General Contractors 1 
Construction - Special Trade Contractors 1 
Manufacturing 
Food and Kindred Products 13 
Tobacco 1 
Textile Mill Products 14 
Apparel and Other Finished Products 
Made from Fabrics and Similar Materials 3 
Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture 3 
Furniture and Fixtures 1 
Paper and Allied Products 15 
Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 5 
Chemicals and Allied Products 27 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 15 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 13 
Leather and Leather Products 3 
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete Products 7 
Transportation Equipment  1_ 
TOTAL 128 
108 
Table 3 
Experimental Group 1 - Chronological Distribution of the Changes 
Year Number of Firms 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1 
1 
0 
4 
112 
10 
TOTAL 128 
109 
Table 4 
Experimental Group 2 - Industry Classification 
Industry Group Number of Firms 
Manufacturing 
Food and Kindred Products 5 
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made 
from Fabrics and Similar Materials 2 
Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture 1 
Paper and Allied Products 1 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 2 
Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery 
and Transportation Equipment 1 
Machinery, except Electrical 1 
Electrical and Electronic Machinery, 
Equipment, and Supplies 1 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply 
and Mobile Home Dealers 1 
General Merchandise Stores 3 
Food Stores 2 
Transportation by Air 1 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 1 
TOTAL 22 
110 
Table 5 
Experimental Group 2 - - Chronological Distribution of the Changes 
Year Number of Firms 
1972 2 
1973 1 
1974 0 
1975 1 
1976 0 
1977 14 
1978 4 
22 TOTAL 
Ill 
Table 6 
Summary Statistics of Matching Variables - Experimental Group 1 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Unexpected Change in 
Earnings* 22.628 5.100 62.286 
Earnings Yield .153 .143 .084 
Leverage 1.685 1.170 1.554 
Systematic Risk .926 .910 .315 
*In millions 
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Table 7 
Summary Statistics of Matching Variables - Experimental Group 2 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Unexpected Change in 
Earnings* 25.871 9.921 43.796 
Earnings Yield -.027 .104 .465 
Leverage 2.316 1.519 2.397 
Systematic Risk .943 .990 .357 
*In millions 
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Table 8 
Summary Statistics of Matching Variables 
Potential Control Group Members 
Year Variable Mean 
1970 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* -1.403 
Earnings Yield .058 
Leverage 1.807 
Systematic Risk 1.051 
1971 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 2.684 
Earnings Yield .039 
Leverage 2.216 
Systematic Risk 1.043 
1972 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 3.007 
Earnings Yield .043 
Leverage 2.100 
Systematic Risk 1.067 
1973 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 5.171 
Earnings Yield .058 
Leverage 2.256 
Systematic Risk 1.059 
Median Standard Deviation 
.080 29.977 
.064 .063 
.810 3.257 
1.053 .381 
.464 35.695 
.063 .145 
1.019 3.817 
1.035 .385 
.821 14.458 
.058 .106 
.929 3.616 
1.082 .290 
.729 35.439 
.070 .107 
1.051 3.846 
1.082 .404 
*In millions 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Year Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
1974 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 1.308 .276 48.693 
Earnings Yield .097 .126 .501 
Leverage 4.298 2.073 6.805 
Systematic Risk 1.014 1.017 .305 
1975 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* -1.094 
.=r 
C
O
 
C
O
 
. 34.340 
Earnings Yield .041 .179 1.151 
Leverage 7.610 3.447 11.796 
Systematic Risk .993 .983 
C
O
 
■=r 
cn • 
1976 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 7.065 1.185 51.425 
Earnings Yield .040 .126 .596 
Leverage 5.521 2.300 9.430 
Systematic Risk 1.004 .989 .350 
1977 Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 4.813 1.159 37.116 
Earnings Yield .043 .114 .683 
Leverage 4.728 1.784 15.454 
Systematic Risk 1.010 .998 .336 
*In millions 
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Table 8 (cont.) 
Year Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
All 
Years 
Unexpected Change 
in Earnings* 2.781 .589 37.837 
Earnings Yield .053 .087 .566 
Leverage 3.910 1.504 8.819 
Systematic Risk 1.024 1.018 .368 
*In millions 
NOTE: Although a few changes took place in 1978, no data was needed 
on the matching variables for this year. This is due to the 
fact that all 1978 changes took place in January and the 
Compustat convention of treating the data of firms with fiscal 
year ends of January through May as being associated with the 
previous calendar year. 
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Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Unexpected Change in 
Earnings* 
Earnings Yield 
Leverage 
Systematic Risk 
Table 9 
of Matching Variables - Control Group 1 
Mean Median 
17.103 1.443 
.128 .139 
1.721 1.257 
.940 .924 
Standard Deviation 
62.203 
.126 
1.609 
.318 
*In millions 
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Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Unexpected Change in 
Earnings* * 
Earnings Yield 
Leverage 
Systematic Risk 
Table 10 
of Matching Variables - Control Group 2 
Mean Median 
13.000 1.931 
.019 .104 
1.429 .933 
.940 .921 
Standard Deviation 
29.514 
.344 
1.292 
.343 
*In millions 
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Table 11 
2 
Hotelling T Tests on Matching Variables 
Experimental Group 1 - Control Group 1 F Value P Value 
One sample test 3.635 .008 
Two sample test 1.164 .327 
Experimental Group 2 - Control Group 2 
One sample test 2.515 .078 
Two sample test 1.320 .280 
119 
Table 12 
Summary of Scores 
Group • Mean Median 
Maximum 
Value 
All D Scores 5.640 1.241 548.161 
Experimental Group 1 - Control Group 1 .337 -072 9.686 
Experimental Group 2 - Control Group 2 1.032 .127 9.134 
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Table 15 
Market Model Regressions - Experimental and Control Group 1 
Experimental Group 1 R-Square 
OLS 
Beta 
Vasicek 
Beta 
CVW Index 
4 years prior to the test period .272 1.231 1.204 
2 years on either side of the 
test period .274 1.152 1.142 
4 years after the test period .298 1.124 1.111 
CEW Index - - 
4 years prior to the test period .316 .921 .906 
2 years on either side of the 
test period .321 .895 .886 
4 years after the test period .318 .910 .902 
Control Group 1 
CVW Index 
4 years prior to the test period .237 1.221 1.193 
2 years on either side of the 
test period .235 1.126 1.114 
4 years after the test period .264 1.152 1.118 
CEW Index 
4 years prior to the test period .283 .9«3 .914 
2 years on either side of the 
test period .286 .920 .888 
4 years after the test period .303 1.001 .949 
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Table 16 
Market Model Regressions - Experimental and Control Group 2 
Experimental Group 2 
CVW Index 
4 years prior to the test period 
2 years on either side of the 
test period 
2 years prior to the test period 
2 years after the test period 
CEW Index 
4 years prior to the test period 
2 years on either side of the 
test period 
2 years prior to the test period 
2 years after the test period 
Control Group 2 
CVW Index 
4 years prior to the test period 
2 years on either side of the 
test period 
2 years prior to the test period 
2 years after the test period 
R-Square 
OLS 
Beta 
Vasicek 
Beta 
.290 1.097 1.088 
.336 1.202 1.156 
.238 1.072 1.036 
.457 1.341 1.230 
.336 .920 .891 
.359 .929 .897 
.265 .896 .831 
.475 .992 .947 
297 1.125 1.130 
296 1.209 1.166 
250 1.006 1.074 
388 1.303 1.216 
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Table 16 (cont.) 
Control Group 2 R-Square 
OLS 
Beta 
Vasicek 
Beta 
CEW Index 
4 years prior to the test period .330 .942 .918 
2 years on either side of the 
test period .315 .935 .904 
2 years prior to the test period .261 .838 .837 
2 years after the test period .407 .956 .933 
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Table 17 
Trading Volume Regressions - All Groups 
Statistic 
t value means 
coefficient d 
coefficient f 
coefficient g 
intercept 
Experimental 
Group 1 
Control 
Group 1 
Experimental 
Group 2 
Control 
Group 2 
1.045 2.855 2.915 2.415 
- .303 - .953 -1.413 -1.335 
o
o
 
o
o
 
C
O
 
• 3.509 3.419 2.986 
-1.162 - .731 
C
O
 
C
O
 
m
 
• .000 
.424 .409 .443 .355 
13.299 12.968 15.207 9.843 F value mean 
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Table 22 
2 
Hotelling T Tests - SFAS No. 13 Changes Only- 
Beta estimation period for CARs: four years prior to the test period 
cvw CEW 
Means t values Means t values 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Change 
Group 
Control 
Group 
CARs 
• 
V
O
 
o
 
o
 • i .053 -1.24 -.056 -.002 -1.15 
Beta Change .161 .240 - .44 .045 .129 - .65 
Volume CARs -.131 -.061 - .65 -.131 -.061 - .65 
T2 2.175 2.345 
F value (p value) .640 ( .601) .690 ( .572) 
Beta estimation period for CARs: 
period 
two years on either side of the test 
CARs .032 .108 -1.73 -.056 .019 
-1.72 
Beta Change .161 .240 - .44 .045 .129 - .65 
Volume CARs -.131 -.061 - .65 -.131 -.061 - .65 
2 
T 3.108 3.478 
F value (p value) .914 ( .458) 1.023 ( .410) 
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Table 23 
Hotelling T 
2 
Tests, Stable Beta Firms* - SFAS No. 13 Changes Only 
Beta estimation period for CARs: four years prior to the test period 
CVW CEW 
Means t values Means t values 
Dependent 
Variable 
Change 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Change 
Group 
Control 
Group 
CARs .021 .095 -1.92 -.043 .054 -2.10 
Volume CARs -.044 -.109 .51 -.043 -.021 - .16 
T2 5.202 4.407 
F value (p value) 2.384 ( .138) 2.020 ( .179) 
Beta estimation period for CARs: 
period 
two years on either side of the test 
CARs .069 .128 -1.04 -.029 .077 -2.25 
Volume CARs -.044 -.109 .51 -.043 -.021 - .16 
2 
T 2.150 5.633 
F value (p value) .985 ( .404) 2.582 ( .120) 
2 
*Beta stability was assessed at the .05 level. T tests based upon 
firms exhibiting a stable beta at the .01 level resulted in no important 
differences from the statistics reported here. T tests were also 
conducted on firms exhibiting a stable regression plane (as opposed to 
a stable slope coefficient). Again no important differences were found. 
NOTE: Sample size for the CVW and the CEW tests was 13. 
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Table 25 
Tests on Changes in the Cost of Goods Sold Percentage 
Period Means t value p value* 
Year prior to the change 
less year of the change 
Experimental 
-2.34 
Control 
-.48 3.16 .001 
Year of the change less 
year after the change -3.00 -.88 3.71 .000 
*One sided test 
NOTE: Due to missing data on the COMPUSTAT Tapes, the above tests 
were performed on a sample of 92 matched pairs. 
136 
Table 26 
Correlations Between CARs and Changes in CGS56 - LIFO Changes 
Correlations (p values) 
Period Pearson Spearman Kendall 
Year prior to the change 
less year of the change .159 (.065) .243 (.013) .161 (.012) 
Year of the change less 
year after the change .415 (.001) .375 (.001) .263 (.001) 
Both periods combined .465 (.001) .457 (.001) 
o
 
C
O
 
m
 
• (.001) 
NOTE: The CARs used here were generated by using the CEW Vasicek 
adjusted beta estimated based upon the 48 monthly observations 
preceding the test period. Correlations were calculated using 
Vasicek adjusted betas from other estimation periods and the 
other index. No important differences were found. 
Due to missing data on the COMPUSTAT Tapes, the above correlations 
were based on a sample of 92 firms. 
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APPENDIX B 
LIFC Changes 
Ch a r. g e Cosp sr. i e s 
1. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. 
. Phelps Docge Corp. 
. Hcnestaxe Mining 
. St. Joe Minerals Corp. 
. Occidental Petroleuc Corp. 
Halliburton Co. 
. Anthony Industries Inc. 
. Anderson, Clayton A Co. 
. Caupbell Soup Co. 
. General Mills Inc. 
Tasty Baking Co. 
Am star Corp. 
A-alganatec Sugar Co. 
. Michigan Sugar 
. Hershey Foods Corp. 
. MacAncrews A Fortes 
. Publicker Industries Inc. 
. Coca-Cola Bottling Co of SY 
. Pepcca Industries 
. Wcretco Enterprises Inc. 
. Feynolds (B. J.) Incs. 
. Avondale Mills 
. Burlington Industries Inc. 
. Cone Mills Corp. 
. Dan River Inc. 
. Fat Industries Inc. 
. Fielccrest Mills 
Grar.iteville Co. 
. Mount Yernon Mills Inc. 
Peeves Brothers Inc. 
. Riegel Textile Corp. 
. Bussell Corp. 
. Springs Mills Inc. 
. Standard Cocsa-Thatcr.er 
. Masland (C. H.) A Sons 
. duett, Peabody A Co. 
. Hart Schaffner A Marx Co. 
. Kunsingwear Inc. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. 
SC. Masonite Corp. 
*1. Core hence Inc. 
Sc r. charge Cor sanies 
1. Heleca Mining Co. 
2. Se --rent Mining Corp. 
2. Dcre Mines LTD 
S. Eastern Gas A Fuel Assoc 
5. Getty Cil Co. 
6. Fluor Corp. 
7. Dynalectron Corp. 
8. Bartons Candy Corp. 
9. Ralston Purina Co. 
1C. Pepsicc Inc. 
11. General Foods Corp. 
12. Folly Sugar Corp. 
13- Herrel (Geo. A. ) A Co 
Int'l Multifoods Corp. 
15- Border. Inc. 
*6. Iowa Beef processors 
17. General Cir.era Corp. 
18. Tootsie Pell Industries 
19. United Foods Inc. 
2C. Cagle's Inc. 
21. Philip Morris Inc. 
22. Adars-Millis Corp. 
22. Alba-Waldensian Inc. 
2*. Fabier. Corp. 
25. Lowenstein (M) Corp. 
26. Edecs Corp. 
2". Belding Resinway 
28. Arerican Mfg. Co. 
29. Huyck Corp. 
30. Collins A Aikran Corp. 
31. Satior.al Spinning Co. 
32. St evens (J. P.) A Co. 
23- Croepton Co. Inc. 
3». Cpelika Mfg. Corp. 
25. Ccroo Incs. 
26. V. F. Corp. 
3". Decorator Industries Inc 
25. Wilson Brothers 
29. Tech-5yr Corp. 
SO. Golden West Fores 
*1. Yir.tage Enterprise Inc. 
n.c. 
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42. Mohasco Corp. 
43. Chesapeake Corp. of Va. 
44. Crown Zellerbach 
45. Diamond Int'l Corp. 
46. Great Northern Nekoosa 
47. Hammermill Paper Co. 
48. Kimberly-Clark Corp. 
49. St. Regis Paper Co. 
50. Union Camp Corp. 
51. Eemis Co. 
52. Dennison Mfg. Co. 
53. Sorg Paper Co. 
54. Technical Tape Inc. 
55. Connelly Containers Inc. 
56. Maryland Cup Corp. 
57. Paramount Packaging 
58. Times Mirror Co. 
59. Meredith Corp. 
60. Donnelley (R.R.) 4 Sons 
61. Ennis Business Forms 
62. Safeguard Inds. Ind. 
63- American Cyanamid Co. 
64. EMC Corp. 
65. Grace (W. R.) 4 Co. 
66. Hercules Inc. 
67. Monsanto Co. 
68. Olin Corp. 
69. Pennwalt Corp. 
70. Stauffer Chemical Co. 
71. Essex Chemical Corp. 
72. Ethyl Corp. 
73» Great Lakes Chemical Corp. 
74. Reichhold Chemicals Inc. 
75. Pfizer Inc. 
76. Upjohn Co. 
77. Proctor 4 Gamble Co. 
78. Stepan Chemical Co. 
79. Avon Products 
80. Carter-Wallace Inc. 
81. Guardsman Chemicals Inc. 
82. Pratt 4 Lambert Inc. 
83. Fairmount Chemical Co Inc 
84. Koppers Co. 
85. Nalco Chemical Co. 
86. Dexter Corp. 
87. Ferro Corp. 
88. Park Chemical Co. 
89. Sun Chemical Corp. 
90. Ashland Oil Inc. 
91. Crown Central Petroleum 
. New Idria Inc. 
. Potlatch Corp. 
. American Israeli Paper Mills 
. Simkins Industries 
. Int'l Paper Co. 
. Boise Cascade Corp. 
. Bowater Corp. LTD-ADR 
. Domtar Inc. 
. Kleer-Vu Industries Inc. 
. Brown Co. 
. APL Co . 
. Federal Paper Board Co. 
. Ludlow Corp. 
. Whippany Paperboard 
. Papercraft Corp. 
. Clevepak Corp. 
. Capital Cities Communication 
. Areata Corp. 
. Gannett Co. 
. Time Inc. 
. Filmways Inc. 
. Air Products 4 Chemicals Inc. 
. Johnson Products 
. Williams Cos. 
. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 
. Imperial Chem. Inds. LTD-ADR 
. U. S. Radium Corp. 
. First Mississippi Corp. 
. National Distillers 4 Chemical 
. Del Laboratories Inc. 
. Crompton 4 Knowles Corp. 
. Nestle-Lemur Co. 
. Insilco Corp. 
. Bristol-Myers Co. 
. Lilly (Eli) 4 Co. 
. American Home Products Corp. 
. Dutch Boy Inc. 
. Economics Laboratory Inc. 
. Mary Kay Cosmetics 
. Gillette Co. 
. Valspar Corp. 
. Morton-Norwich Products 
. Int’l Minerals 4 Chemical 
. Rorer Group 
. Sherwin-Williams Co. 
. Purex Industries Inc. 
. Oakite Products. 
. Helene Curtis Industries 
. American Petrofina 
. Walter (Jim) Corp. 
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46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92. Crystal Oil Co. 
93. Earth Resources Co. 
94. Husky Oil LTD 
95. Kerr-McGee Corp. 
96. Marathon Oil Co. 
97. Murphy Oil Corp. 
98. Pennzoil Co. 
99. Shell Oil Co. 
100. Standard Oil Co. (Calif) 
101. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio) 
102. Texaco Inc. 
103. Witco Chemical Corp. 
104. Certain-Teed Corp. 
105. Armstrong Rubber 
106. Carlisle Corp. 
107. Cooper Tire 4 Rubber 
108. Firestone Tire 4 Rubber Co 
109. General Tire 4 Rubber Co. 
110. Goodrich (B. F-.) Co. 
111. Great American Industries 
112. Vulcan Corp. 
113. Armstrong Cork Co. 
114. Chelsea Industries Inc. 
115. Clopay Corp. 
116. Crest-Foam Corp. 
117. Rubbermaid Inc. 
118. Barry (R. G.) 
119. Brown Group Inc. 
120. McDonough Co. 
121. Anchor Hocking Corp. 
122. Brockway Glass Co. 
123. Corning Glass Works 
124. Dorsey Corp. 
125. Owen-Illinois Inc. 
126. Ideal Easic Inds. Inc. 
127. Southdown Inc. 
128. Cessna Aircraft Co. 
92. Quaker State Oil Refining 
93* Gulf Canada LTD 
94. Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
95. Imperial Oil LTD 
96. Union Oil Co. of Cal. 
97. Belco Petroleum Corp. 
98. CKC Corp. 
99. Sun Co. 
00. British Petroleum Co. LTD 
01. Clark Oil 4 Refining Corp. 
02. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
03. Holly Corp. 
04. Amerada Hess Corp. 
05. Uniroyal Inc. 
06. Aegis Corp. 
07. Cetec Corp. 
08. Glasrock Products 
09. Dart Industries 
10. Hoover Universal Inc. 
11. Alliance Tire 4 Rubber Co. 
12. Dayco Corp. 
13. Rogers Corp. 
14. Cellu-Craft Inc. 
15. Wellco Enterprises 
16. Robintech Inc. 
17. O'Sullivan Corp. 
18. Weyenberg Shoe Mfg. Co. 
19. Stride Rite Corp. 
20. U. S. Shoe Corp. 
21. Lone Star Industries 
22. Texas Industries Inc. 
23. National Gypsum Co. 
24. Seagrave Corp. 
25. Interpace Corp. 
26. Johns-Manville Corp. 
27. Republic Gypsum Co. 
28. Lear Siegler Inc 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
FASB No 13 Changes 
1. Pillsbury Co. 
2. General Host Corp. 
3. Greyhound Corp. 
4. Rath Packing Co. 
5. Levi Strauss 4 Co. 
6. Champion Int'l Corp. 
7. Mead Corp. 
8. Phillips Petroleum Co. 
9. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) 
10. Continental Group. 
11. Pitney-Bowes Inc. 
12. Lynch Corp. 
13. Evans Products Co. 
14. Goldblatt Brothers 
15. May Department Stores 
16. Sears, Roebuck 4 Co. 
17. Albertson's 
18. National Tea Co. 
1. Campbell Taggart Inc. 
2. Tobin Packing Co. Inc. 
3. Smucker (J. M.) Co. 
4. Pittsburgh Brewing 
5. U. S. Industries 
6. Pope 4 Talbot Inc. 
7. Rexham Corp. 
8. Mobil Corp. 
9. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
10. Raymond Industries Inc. 
11. Foster Wheeler Corp. 
12. Craig Corp. 
13. Mobile Home Industries 
14. Almy Stores Inc. 
15. Allied Stores 
16. K Mart Corp. 
17. Weis Markets Inc. 
18. Pueblo International Inc 
ITC Changes 
1. Consolidated Foods Corp. 1. Carnation Co. 
2. Fairfield-Noble Corp. 2. Schrader (Abe) Corp 
3- Continental Air Lines Inc. 3- PSA Inc. 
4. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 4. Union Electric Co. 
APPENDIX C 
CUMULATIVE FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DERIVATION 
The purpose of this appendix is to derive expressions for a cumula¬ 
tive forecast error variance in both the simple and multiple regression 
contexts. These variances are needed for the firm level analysis. 
Simple Regression Context 
Consider the linear relationship 
Y = a + bX + e (1) 
where X and Y are the independent and dependent variables respectively, 
a and b are estimated parameters of the relationship and e is a distur¬ 
bance terms which satisfies the usual OLS assumptions. 
The variance of an individual forecast error, FEV, can be expressed 
as (see Kmenta (1976), p. 241): 
FEV = T [1 
e 
1 (X - x)2 
— o_ 
N + N ? 
£ (X. - xr 
i=1 1 
(2) 
2 
where T is the variance of the disturbance term in (1) 
e 
N is the number of observations over which the parameters of 
(1) are estimated 
X,S are values of the independent variable in the estimation 
i 
period 
X is the mean of the independent variable in the estimation 
period, and 
X is the value of the independent variable for which a fore- 
o 
cast is sought 
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In deriving the cumulative forecast error variance (CFEV), it is 
convenient to view a cumulative forecast error (CFE) as the difference 
between 1) the sum of the actual observations and 2) the sum of the 
estimated values. Let Y refer to the sum of the actual observations 
lu 
A 
and Y. refer to the sum of the forecasts. 
Li 
YL “ yi + y2 
A A A 
yt = y + y. 
i 
•+y. 
A 
>+yT 
where y 1 are individual observations 
A S 
y.' are individual forecasts and 
l 
L is the number of periods in the forecast 
Then 
(3) 
(4) 
CFE = Y - Y 
Li Li 
Since Y. and $ are independent [ 1] 
Li Li 
CFEV = Var (Y ) + Var(Y ) 
L Li 
(5) 
(6) 
Assuming zero serial correlation f2] among observations, the first terra 
on the right hand side of (6) can be expressed as: 
VAR(Yl) = VarCy^ + Var(y2) +...+ Var(yL) 
Invoking the homoskedasticity assumption yields 
Var(Y.) = LT 
L e 
(7) 
Turning to the second term on the right hand side of (6), Y^ can be 
written as: 
Y^ = a+bX^ + a+bX^ + • • + a + bXT 
= La + (X^ + X2 +...+X^)b 
Yl therefore is the weighted sum of two random variables, a and b, and 
VarCY^) can be expressed as: 
A 2 p 
Var(YL) = L Var(a) + (X1 + X2 + ...+ X ) Var(b) + 
2L(X^ + X2 + ...+ X^) Cov(a,b) 
Substituting for Var(a), Var(b) and Cov(a,b) (see Kmenta (1976), pp. 217- 
220) results in 
-2 
'e N ' N + (X1 + X2 +***XL) Te ^ 
A . 2 2 i- 1 
Var(YL) = L T C ^ + 
E(X. - X)' 
i = 1 
-2L(X! + X2 XL> XTe [ N 
1 
£(X. - X)2 
1=1 
(8) 
2(X. - X)2 
i=1 1 
Finally, substituting expressions (7) and (8) in expression (6) yields: 
1 
+ . -y )'d r-— CFEV = LT? + L2Tf [^ + u 
e e N N 
x2 
£(X. - X)2 
i=1 1 
-2L(X, + X„ +...+ XT ) XT2 [- 
2 Lew 
)* (X1 + X2 +-"+ \)2 T^N 
1 
?(X. - X)2 
i=1 1 
(9) 
£(X. - X)2 
i= 1 
Multiple Regression Context 
This section will follow the notation of the previous section as 
closely as possible. Consider the linear relationship 
Y = a * b,X1 + e (10) 
The variance of an individual forecast error, FEV, can be expressed as 
(see Kmenta (1976), p. 375): 
FEV = T2 + T2/N + z (X , - X, )2 Var(b, ) 
e e k-1 ok k k 
K 
+ 2 S(X - X.)(X , - x, ) Cov(b ,b ) 
j<k oj j 0k k j k 
j >k = 1 > • ••» X , j<k 
(11) 
As before, express the cumulative forecast error, CFE, as the dif¬ 
ference between the summation of the actual observations and the summa¬ 
tion of the forecasts: 
CFE = Y. - Y 
Li Lj 
/I 
Since Y and YT are independent 
L *-• 
CFEV = Var(YL) + Var(?L) 
(12) 
(13) 
Assuming zero serial correlation among the observations, the first term 
on the right hand side of (13) can be expressed as: 
Var(YL) = Var(y1) + Var(y2) +...+ Var(yL) 
= LT2 (14) 
Rewriting Y^ we have 
\ = LatVX1k + X2k+-"+ k=1 
Letting A, ..B^ represent the true parameters of expression (10), 
the second term on the right hand side of (13) can be expressed as: 
Var(YL) = E[Yl- E(YL)f 
= E[La + Z (X„ + X.. +”'+ XLk)bk * LA ' 
K 
2(X 
k= 1 
Ik 2k 
k= 1 
+ X + . ..XT1 )B J 
Ik 2k Lk kJ 
K 
= E[L(a-A) + x (^n, + X^k 
(15) 
k= 1 
Ik Lk 
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Since Ey^ in the estimation period, we know that 
i=1 i=1 
a + b,X, +...+ bKXK = A + +...+ 3RXK 
a - A = BlX, - b,X + ...♦ BrXk - bKXK ♦ S 
a - A = -(b^- B1)X1-- (hK-BK)XK + e (16) 
Substituting (16) in (15) results in 
K K 
Var(YL) = B[L(-E(b1-Bk)Xl. + el + s(X,k +...+ ' 
k= 1 ‘ k=1 
K 
= EtLe + E(X +...+ Xyk - LXk)(bk-Bk)] 
k= 1 
Lk 
K 
= lV/N + E(XV + ••• + xLk " LXk)2 Var(bk) 
K 0 k=1 
+ 2E(X ♦ X - LX )(Xlk + ...+ XLk- LXk)Covfb.bk) 
j<k 
(17) 
j,k = 1»•••> X j <k 
Substituting (14) and (17) into (13) we have 
K o 
CFEV = LT2 + L2T2/N + E(X +...+ X - LXk)'var(b. ) 
e e k-1 Ik Lk k k 
K 
+ 2S(X + ...+ X - LX )<X1k+...+ XLk- LXk)Cov(b.,bk) 
j<k J - J (18) 
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Footnotes 
/\ 
1. Y^ and are indeDendent since they are each functions of 
different sets of disturbance terms (see Kmenta (1976), p. 240). 
2. Fama (1976) provides evidence concerning the lack of serial, 
correlation among monthly security returns. 


